

REALITY

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REALITY is published twice yearly by the student brothers of the Dominican Province of St. Albert the Great. Intended primarily for circulation within the Dominican Order, REALITY'S articles are largely the result of work done by the students within the Pontifical Faculty of Philosophy, River Forest, Illinois, and the General Studium of Theology, Dubuque, Iowa.

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God, the Highest Truth, has created and guides human intellect, not that it may daily oppose new truths to rightly established ones but rather that having eliminated errors which may have crept in, it may build truth upon truth in the same order and structure that exist in reality, the source of truth.

Pius XII

Encyclical Humani Generis

DEDICATION

REALITY DEDICATES this issue to an eminent Dominican theologian, who needs no introduction to REALITY'S reading public. Those who move in philosophical or theological circles realize that he occupies a place apart; American religious recognize him as a master of the spiritual life; and students of the sacred sciences see in him the surest of guides along the paths of Thomistic learning.

In the Eternal City last November, this prominent priest-theologian celebrated the 50th anniversary of his priestly ordination. By a singularly unfortunate circumstance, news of this occasion reached St. Rose Priory only after the last issue of REALITY had been sent to the press and we were therefore unable to take notice of the occasion at that time. With this issue REALITY seeks to compensate for the omission and belatedly extends sincerest congratulations and prayerful best wishes to a truly outstanding Dominican.

The student brothers of the Province of St. Albert the Great dedicate this issue of their bi-annual review to the Very Reverend Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange. There are a number of reasons for so doing. In the first place, through the apostolate of his prolific pen, Father Garrigou-Lagrange has been perhaps the foremost representative of the Dominican ideal in our own day. Even in this country, though he is not an American, he has brought great honor to the Church and to his Order through the many English translations of his works, which have appeared here in the last two decades. We note with pride that these volumes recently secured for him a place in the Living Gallery of Catholic Authors here in the United States.

But in a more immediate and personal way, these works have been invaluable assets to the students of his order, and to seminarians in general. His commentaries upon the works of the Common Doctor, as well as his several works applying St. Thomas' theological principles to the spiritual life, are volumes which with good reason have become standard equipment for the student's room, volumes whose worn pages bear silent witness to frequent use and constant reference.

Beyond this, there is a sense in which the students of his Order here in the United States have a right to feel a yet closer bond of union with this famed Master of the Order's Roman College. The faculties of our houses of study are largely comprised of professors who were privileged to follow "Father Garrigou's" course in their studies abroad. These, in taking their place on the lecture platform at home, become a bridge over which the wisdom acquired from a true Master is passed on to his younger brethren in this country. The student of St. Albert's Province, then, feels amply justified in acknowledging Father Garrigou-Lagrange not only as his brother in religion – this he says with humility – but also in a real sense as his master.

That this is so may be gathered from the words of REALITY'S first student editor, quoted by our Provincial (himself a onetime student in Father Garrigou-Lagrange's classroom) in his introductory message for REALITY'S first issue:

> It was a source of satisfaction then to find the same title [*Reality*] applied to the recent English translation of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's Thomistic synthesis. We have no illusions that our publication will ever attain to the depths of scholarship acquired by this great Thomist. But we feel that the coincidental choice of the same name will serve to keep ever before us our ideal, of which he is the living embodiment.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange will ever be for the student of the Angelic Doctor an embodiment of the Thomistic ideal. The dedication, then, of this number of our Thomistic review, is based on our recognizing him as the personification of all that is best in the tradition of Thomas. We entertain no illusions regarding the youthful efforts that are expressed in REALITY'S pages. Yet we dedicate them, precisely as they are an expression of youth, to an ideal who like a beacon-light guides us safely in the things of spirit and mind.

There is much more we could say, but we prefer to let it be spoken for us by a man who has enjoyed the privilege of living in close association with Father Garrigou-Lagrange for many years. On the pages that follow, we present the thoughts of an intimate friend expressed on the occasion of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's golden jubilee last November.

We offer, too, the letter of gratitude we have received from Father Garrigou-Lagrange, written to us when he learned of our intention to honor him in this edition of our publication. Without commentary, we proudly reprint this letter here, for the benefit of all.

The students of St. Albert's Province offer herewith to Father Garrigou-Lagrange their fraternal and yet esteemed congratulations on the occasion of his completion of fifty years in the apostolic ministry. We look upon him as one who has been eminently successful in combining in his person and in his life the characteristics of the Dominican ideal: priest and religious, theologian and professor, writer and lecturer. By way of conclusion, perhaps the explanation of such a full life can be no better expressed than in his own words:

In the life of the priest, above all in the life of a professor, whether of philosophy or not, it is a great grace to have been fashioned in the principles of St. Thomas. . . . These directing principles of thought and life become ever more necessary as the conditions of existence grow ever more difficult, demanding a certitude more firm, a faith more immovable, a love of God more pure and strong.[1]

---

[1]*Reality* (B. Herder Book Co., St. Louis: 1950. Trans. by Rev. Patrick Cummins, O.S.B.), p. 367.

ANGELICUM

SS. DOMENICO E SISTO

Roma, (2)
Salita del Grillo, 1

12 March, 1953

Dear Students:

The Very Reverend Father Hughes, Provincial of St. Albert's Province, and a former student at the Angelicum, has just informed me that the next issue of Reality will commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of my ordination to the priesthood.

I am both honored and grateful and I wish to extend my heartfelt thanks to every member of the province. I could not better express my gratitude than by taking this occasion to recall the importance and necessity of a religious life dedicated to the doctrinal apostolate of the pen.

Souls desirous of a true interior life realize that this life must transcend the sentimentality with which it is often confused. Sentimentality, which springs from our sensitive appetites, can be only a pretended love of God and of neighbor having no deep roots in the will. To lift oneself higher, the true interior life must be based on theological faith, a faith illumined by the light of divine revelation, for "the just man lives by faith" (Gal. 3:11).

The ability to defend the existence of revelation, then, is fundamental for one who aspires to a true interior life. He must also understand the precise meaning of revealed truths, their subordination, their harmonious interdependence with one another. Nor may he be ignorant of the truths which are derived from these revealed truths. Unless he is familiar with them, he will not appreciate the connection both have with the truths of the natural order. Finally, he must be prepared to answer the objections that are proposed against the mysteries of Christianity.

The traditional Theology, as set forth by St. Thomas Aquinas, offers us much light on these fundamental points. But it is important to understand it well in itself, in order to be able afterwards to translate it faithfully in terms readily understood by all educated people. There is need for a great work of analysis, penetration, synthesis, and adaptation, in order to elevate, bit by bit, the minds of our contemporaries unto a living and fruitful understanding of this traditional teaching.

This is the work which Reality has so earnestly undertaken. Many of the articles already published indicate that it is capable of accomplishing its goal. The editors have shown that they are perfectly aware of the intellectual and spiritual needs of modern man. Their motive is akin to that high purpose which has recently inspired the establishment of the Institute of Spiritual Theology by the fathers of your province. I am particularly pleased with their determination to make a profound study of questions concerning the spiritual life and to diffuse the traditional spiritual doctrine among priests and religious.

With all our heart we congratulate the editors of Reality and implore for them through the intercession of St. Thomas Aquinas, the wisdom and love of God and neighbor which they will need in order to persevere and bear fruit in their worthy undertaking.

Fraternally,

Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange O.P

Roma, Angelico.

GOLDEN JUBILEE[1]

ON THE MORNING of Tuesday, November 18, 1952, in an atmosphere of cordiality and affection, the professors and students of the *Angelicum* assembled around Father Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, the distinguished teacher of that institution, who was celebrating the Mass of his priestly jubilee. Present for the occasion were many personalities and friends unanimous in their desire to manifest to him their veneration and gratitude; they represented the many persons who, in the Church generally and particularly at Rome, have had the privilege of recognizing in him a teacher of Catholic truth and an indefatigable servant of the Church.

His position in the Dominican Order and especially at the *Angelicum*, the Order's Pontifical Institute, is twofold: first, that of an exemplary religious belonging to the spirited company which grew and lived in the supernatural atmosphere created by Father Cormier; and second, that of an unwavering representative of that pure Thomistic tradition in philosophy and theology which constitutes the very substance of Dominican life and spirituality. We do not intend to tax his modesty or to take the risk again of making an unnecessary test of his humility (as we have on a previous occasion in these columns), but this we affirm to be true: that Father Garrigou-Lagrange, both as a religious and as a teacher, has been and remains for his Order one of those who Saint Paul used to refer to as pillars.

For more than forty years (he began teaching at the *Angelicum* in 1909) he has seen generations of students approach and gather around his desk. Many of these in their turn have occupied professorial chairs in seminaries and universities, with the result that the wisdom acquired at Rome through the teaching of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange has been widely disseminated and has borne much fruit.

To his teaching activity, he has joined the work of writing. He began in 1904 with an article in the *Revue Thomiste* entitled *Note sur la preuve*

[1]**This article, translated from the Italian, originally appeared in Osservatore Romano for November 20, 1952. REALITY expresses its thanks for the author's kind permission to use it.**

de Dieu par les degrés des êtres chez S. Thomas. Since then he has produced books and articles at such a rate that they number over three hundred titles. Many of these have been translated into the principal European languages and have found their way into almost every part of the world. We are reminded of a remark made by the Most Reverend Father Suarez, Master General of the Order. During his canonical visitation of the Far East, he said, he had found the books of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange even in the cell of a Buddhist monk.

The immediate impression that one receives on reading through the bibliography of this Master is that the treatises are varied and extensive enough to cover the whole field of philosophy and theology. Every phase of philosophy has received the attention of his pen. He first undertook the more general problems: the nature of philosophy and the right ordering of its parts, universal attraction, finality, the philosophic spirit and the meaning of mystery, and the finding of the definitions of things. Then, more particularly, he treated of such metaphysical problems as the principles of identity and of sufficient reason, the real distinction between essence and existence, the principle of finality, the Thomistic doctrine of act and potency, the primacy of being over becoming, the reciprocity of causes, the philosophy of being, and ontologism. He also dealt with psychological problems, some of which are, the *primum datum intelligentiae,* knowledge, Thomistic realism and the mystery of knowledge, personality, and the specification of acts.

The theological publications of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange are very numerous, and cover every facet of that science. The published series includes the *apologetics,* general problems, an examination of systems, fundamental theology, *an introduction to theology* with studies on the nature and function of theology in general and especially on Thomistic theology; also included are the treatises on *God, Beatitude, Grace, Virtue, The Gifts of the Holy Ghost, Spiritual Progress, Sin, The Contemplative Life, Christ, The Most Holy Virgin,* and *The Sacraments.*

Finally there are his many historical articles, touching upon conspicuous figures and facts in theology and spirituality.

We have here indeed a prodigy of intellectual achievement, a work which in itself is so immense that it seems to defy the delimitation of even fifty years of priestly labor. Yet there is still more. To this scientific and pedagogical work must be added the work of spiritual direction, of retreats, of conferences and lectures, of constant consultations with people of every class, and of labors for the Roman Curia in his capacity of consultor to the Holy See. It was an abundant harvest that was gathered up and placed on the altar of his priestly jubilee, eloquent testimony to the fact that the seed sown by God fifty years ago, enriched with the Sacrament of Orders and nourished by the grace of office, had yielded the "hundredfold" because it had fallen upon the soil of good-will, tireless labor, zeal for souls, love of truth, prayer, and cheerful and generous giving.

The facts speak for themselves. Yet we feel no hesitation in giving expression to them, because we have learned from Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange himself that grace is sublimely transcendant and absolutely gratuitous, and that the good works done by the servants of God cannot reasonably be a matter for pride but rather for the honor and glory of the divine majesty.

If we wish to penetrate more deeply into the comprehensive work of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange, we must single out the important points which give character and individuality to his thought, and then trace its historical and ideological development.

We can begin by marking the first important assertion of Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange in the scientific field. This was through the publication of the volume, *Le sens commun, la philosophie de l'être et les formules dogmatiques* which appeared in 1909. The work was born in a climate of battle. It was that first decade of our century which, after Leo XIII's great revival of Catholic thought, saw the deviation of modernism, and in 1907, the agitation concerning the question of dogmatic formulas. Some attributed to these formulas a common rather than a scientific sense, with the consequent possibility that any single dogma could be interpreted in several substantially diverse ways, according to the variations of the times and of cultural conditions.

In his approach to this problem, Fr. Garrigou-Lagrange re-examines the question of common sense[2] and traces back to it, as to their root, the natural philosophy of human intelligence and the philosophy of being. Then, in treating of dogmatic formulas, he concedes that, while some of these are expressed in a philosophical language so precise as to place them beyond the recognition of common sense, they nevertheless always remain accessible to common sense; and the reason for this lies in the fact that these formulas are no more than elaborations of the philosophy of being, which common sense contains in a rudimentary state. Proceeding in such wise, he was able to rescue dogmatic formulas from enslavement to any particular philosophical system; but we must also note that he likewise gives evidence of their stability and rational value.

The year 1915 signalled the appearance of one of the more important and original of Father Garrigou-Lagrange's volumes: *Dieu, son existence et sa nature.* In this work he begins with an explanation of the fundamental concepts and first principles, and defends their transcendental and ontological value. Having reduced the principle of causality to the principle of contradiction by way of the principle of sufficient reason (a principle which is fundamental to all his philosophical thought), he easily passes on to a demonstration of God's existence and nature. In

[2]"Common sense" here and in the other places it occurs does not refer to the internal sense faculty but to that spontaneous and primitive knowledge enjoyed by every man when, for example, it is declared to him, "Now, that was the sensible thing to do." [Trans.]

the second part of the work the problems of liberty are treated with a completeness that soars high above the Kantian antinomy and the intellectual determinism of Leibnitz.

His *De Revelatione,* written from his course of lectures on that subject at the *Angelicum,* was published in 1918. This work laid a deep and solid foundation for Catholic apologetics and remains a classic in the field of fundamental theology.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange's *Perfection chrétienne et contemplation* (1923), many times translated and widely diffused throughout the world, has served as a source for innumerable other works on spirituality. It is here that he gives a magnificent theological arrangement to the spiritual life according to the principles of Saint Thomas and the doctrine of Saint John of the Cross. Particularly worthy of note is the influence this study has had in making known the universality of the vocation to spiritual perfection and contemplation, and in placing at the disposition of all Christians that lofty theological wisdom which is a leaven to the spiritual life.

From here on we find the interest of Father Garrigou-Lagrange turning more and more in the direction of spiritual studies, to which he has added these valuable contributions: *L'amour de Dieu et la Croix de Jésus* (1919), *La Providence et la confiance en Dieu* (1932), and, with an eye to the needs of our time, two books on priestly sanctification which furnish a fertile pasture for the spiritual life of the cleric.

In the meanwhile, Father Garrigou-Lagrange has continued to teach at the *Angelicum,* commenting on the *Summa* of Saint Thomas (plus a yearly course on the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle), and applying its doctrine to the spiritual life in a special course taught on Saturdays. These special courses have become so popular in Rome that the lecture hall has always been filled to capacity. From his work on the lecture platform have come seven large volumes of exposition, commentary, and development of the theology of Saint Thomas, published between 1938 and 1952. These imposing volumes viewed collectively knit together a solid synthesis of speculation, spirituality, practicable theology, and spiritual experience. They are also a living example of how one can plumb the depths and present the doctrine of Saint Thomas without being unfaithful to him. This Father Garrigou-Lagrange has steadfastly accomplished, for the mind of the Angelic Doctor has quickened again in his own – becoming, as it were, identified with his very spirit. These volumes glow with the light of the consummate theologian who, in possession of an ideal synthesis in a perfect state, sends its shimmering rays through all his intellectual labor.

Father Garrigou-Lagrange has also dedicated a volume to Our Lady, which was published in 1941: *La Mère du Saveur et notre vie spirituelle.* An excellent Mariology, it is profound and graceful, and although scientifically constructed it is ample in its treatment of the problems of the spiritual life.

The last achievement to date is his striking presentation of the "synthesis"; and this was natural and necessary for a great theologian. *La sythèse thomiste* (1950) presents the great moments of Thomistic philosophy and theology in a unified whole, revealing the maturity which comes with a thorough assimilation of the truth.

Here, then, is the key to an understanding of the life and activity of Father Garrigou-Lagrange, his faithfulness to the ideal of his Order – a complete dedication to truth, a generous service to it, and an inflexible defense of it. Here also lies the explanation of the promptness and ardor with which he has many times sprung to the defense of truth, wielding the weapons provided by the doctrines of the Church and of a sane theological tradition. Such work must have cost him dearly, as one who knows intimately his gentleness and goodness easily understands. But it was a theologian's mission and it was commanded by the Church, even though it meant combat, enmity, and the displeasure of many. Even on a mission such as this, the theologian remains within the ranks of Saint Thomas, because Thomas himself moved between the searching and contemplative wisdom of the *Summa Theologiae* and the militant wisdom of the *Summa Contra Gentiles.*

Finally, the splendid seal of charity, always the final proof of a truly dedicated life, has set off the career of Father Garrigou-Lagrange. It was a charity which vivified not only his spiritual but also his corporal works of mercy. November 18th found gathered around his altar those who have received and are yet receiving the light of his wisdom, but there were many others who, while not venturing to join themselves to this select group, were nevertheless a more decorous, even though invisible, crown. These were the poor, his dearest friends, who for many years he has served by helping, visiting, and consoling them with Christlike generosity and patience.

It is a joy for us, on this fiftieth anniversary, to contemplate our distinguished Dominican as he stands before the altar where the truth that he has contemplated and given to others yields to him the rich harvest of a consecrated life. Around him stand a circle of pupils, admirers, confrères, and prelates who testify to the service he has rendered to the cause of truth. Also around him stands a yet wider circle of the poor in both body and in spirit, who have found in him a minister of the charity of Christ.

Truth and charity: these form the diadem of gold which crowns this jubilee. We know that through the prayers of the humble, and the invocation of the Sovereign Pontiff himself, this joyous occasion has been illumined and warmed by the smile of the Infinite God in Whom Truth is identified with Love.

Raymond Spiazzi, O.P.
Cajetan Chereso, O.P.
Translator

THE MASTER OF SACRED THEOLOGY*

SAINT DOMINIC aimed his order at the Primal Truth. He had studied both arts and theology in the ancient and important school of the Cathedral of Palencia.[1] He became a canon regular of the cathedral of Osma; and six years after his priestly ordination he was the prior and head of the chapter of canons. He was drawn from the cloistered contemplation of the cathedral chapter to cross Europe as an attaché to a royal ambassador. He preached as a missionary among the Albigensiam heretics in the south of France.

As a universitarian he had known the excitement and satisfaction of the quest for truth. As a canon regular, he tasted the sweetness of his lone thoughts with the Primal Truth; and he advanced from strength to strength "in swift holiness."[2] On his travels he had seen the fog of ignorance which had settled on untutored minds. In Languedoc he had beheld men "tossed to and fro and carried about by every wind of doctrine devised in the wickedness of men, in craftiness, according to the wiles of error."[3] Universitarian, canon regular, diplomatic attaché, missionary preacher: that was Saint Dominic's novitiate for the founding of his order of preaching brethren whose motto is "Truth."

Saint Dominic did not miss the full import of what Saint Paul had written to Timothy: "God our Savior . . . wishes all men to be saved

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***The following sermon was delivered at the Dominican House of Studies, River Forest, Illinois, by His Excellency, The Most Reverend Edward C. Daly, O.P., on the occasion of the elevation of The Very Reverend John L. Callahan, O.P., and the Very Reverend Sebastian E. Carlson, O.P., to the degree of Master of Sacred Theology.**

[1]E. M. Powicke and A. B. Emden, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), vol. II, p. 66.

[2]Bede Jarrett, *Life of Saint Dominic* (London: Burns, Oats, and Washbourne Ltd., 1934), 11 ff.

[3]Eph. 4:14

and to come to a knowledge of the truth."[4] Saint Dominic grasped that salvation and the knowledge of the truth are synonymous, or as his most illustrious son later put it: *Salus non est nisi per agnitionem veritatis.*[5] To the truth, therefore, he consecrated his order. His sons were not to be a group of glib rhetoricians. He founded an order of apostles. For the work he set before them they had to know how to plumb the depths of truth and the shallows of error; they had to know how to take the true measure of their adversaries. He had no place for the master "who wrappeth sentences in unskilful words."[6] His masters should hold "fast the faithful word which is in accordance with the teaching, that (they) may be able to exhort in sound doctrine and to confute opponents."[7] No sooner, then, had he received the blessing of the Apostolic See upon his plan than he led his little flock to the lectures on theology given at Toulouse by Master Alexander Stravensby,[8] a true schoolman of his age.[9]

By study the preaching friar must prepare himself to carry on the work of his Master, Christ, whose public life was one of teaching. Christ sent His apostles to the world with the express and emphatic command: "Go, make disciples of all nations . . . *teaching* them to observe all that I have commanded you."[10] Study is necessary for those who are to continue that mission; and by study Saint Dominic fitted his disciples to make them "ready to teach"[11] "the word of truth" [12] "which is able to save . . . souls."[13] Study he made the normal, necessary, and permanent duty of his order. He made it of obligation for all. He made it so strict a law of the order that a convent could not be founded without its master. The master of theology was just as necessary as the prior. However frightening, and to some even revolting, may seem the stern mold into which one Master General, Cajetan de Vio, strove to cast the studious habits of the order, it cannot be denied that from our origin and tradition the habitual neglect of the study of the divine truth casts one beyond the Dominican pale with those who fail grievously against the Dominican ideal. At the process of canonization Brother Rudolph of Faenza affirmed that Saint Dominic wished his brethren always to "be diligent in reading, in exortation, and in teaching."[14] One cannot pretend to follow Dominic if one does not continually nourish his spirit on the Word of Truth. One cannot follow Dominic if one does not heed the words of Dominic's Master: "It is written, 'Not by bread alone does man live but every word that comes forth from the mouth of God.' "[15]

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[4]I Tim. 3:3-4
[5]St. Thomas, *In Ep. S. Pauli, in loco.*
[6]Job 38:2
[7]Tit. 1:9
[8]Powicke and Emden, *loc. cit.*, II, 163, n. 1.
[9]Cf. A. W. Hinnebusch, *The Early English Friars Preachers* (Rome: Istituto Storico Domenico, 1951), 443-446.
[10]Matt. 28:19
[11]II Tim. 2:24
[12]II Tim. 2:15
[13]Jas. 1:21
[14]I Tim. 4:13
[15]Matt. 4:4

On the 15th of August, in the year 1217, Saint Dominic scattered his forces over Spain, France, and Italy. Later they were to enter England, Hungary, and the Scandanavian countries; others would embark for Greece and the Holy Land; and from their new posts of vantage they penetrated Russia and Poland and bridged the waters to Greenland. They preached to the Cumans and through all the Balkans; they found their way to the banks of the Volga; they passed over to Morocco. And the Pilgrim Brethren for Christ made their voices sound throughout Asia. Saint Dominic sent his brethren over the world and down the ages with the word of truth as a lamp to their feet and a light to their path.[16] Let others say if they have kept their rendezvous with the papal prophecy: *Pugiles fidei et vera mundi lumina.*[17]

Wherever they went, wherever they taught, and to whomever they taught, they spoke the truth of Him who had identified Himself to His disciples: "One only is your master, the Christ."[18] He is the Master "full of grace and truth."[19] "He came into the world to bear witness to the truth."[20] He came not as a prophet, nor as one greater than a prophet, but with His own message. And He required not only that His word be accepted but that He too be taken for what He claimed to be; and He wrought miracles that all might recognize Him, as Nicodemus did. He is "Master and Lord";[21] He taught with unheard-of authority. He revealed the very secrets of the divine life. He bared the hidden details of man's redemption. He laid open the future of Jerusalem and of the Jewish people. He disclosed the events of the day which will close the world's history. He dominated every circumstance of His life. With those who would ensnare Him by their questions, He dealt with masterly calm. Before those who tried to cow Him by their authority He comported Himself serenely. Stern as He was toward the Pharisees for their spurious laws and trumped-up traditions, to little children, to the ailing and the poor, to the sinners and the outcasts He was the gentle master, "meek and humble of heart."[22]

Your one only Master, the Christ, "was the light which enlightens every man who comes into the world . . . and the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us and we saw His glory as of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth . . . and of His fullness we have all received grace for grace. For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ."[23] And, "It has pleased God, the Father," wrote Saint Paul, "that in Him all His fullness should dwell and that through Him He should reconcile to Himself all things whether on earth or in the heavens, making peace through the blood of His

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[16]Cf. Ps. 118, 105
[17]Cf. *Constitutiones S.O.P.*, n. 1, § II.
[18]Matt. 23:10
[19]John 1:14
[20]John 18:37
[21]John 13:13
[22]Matt. 11:29
[23]John 1:9

cross";[24] "for in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, and in Him who is the head of every Principality and Power you have received of that fullness."[25]

It was the splendor of that sanctity which made saints of the sinful woman who approached Him as He reclined at Simon's dinner-table, of the Canaanite woman, of the Samaritan woman, and of all who hearken to the Master "in a contrite and humble spirit."[26]

Your one only Master, the Christ, is God and man. His godly omniscience and holiness accented His personality as a teacher of men. Christ the Master is not hemmed in by any boundaries of time or space; He is a stranger and foreigner nowhere; He is a teacher for every age and all countries; for every class and for every person. He is the timeless and universal master to whom our own bewildered and often stupid age had best return: "Lord, to whom shall we go? Thou hast the words of everlasting life, and we have come to believe and to know that thou art the Christ, the Son of God."[27]

Justly did St. Thomas make an axiom of the preachment of Pope Innocent III: *Omnis Christi actio nostra est instructio.*[28] Those who take the ministry of Christ's mastership must take to themselves also the lesson of knowledge and holiness which His life exemplifies. With that example in mind Pope Pius XI, of glorious memory, reminded religious superiors *ut magistri altioribus disciplinis apud vos tradendis plane idonei deligantur, tales nempe ut suo vitae instituto exempli instar sint eaque eruditissimi doctrina qua discipulorum mentes excolere iubeantur.*[29]

To the master's chair the teacher must ascend with "the full knowledge of the truth which is according to piety."[30] The master — and it is the Angelic Doctor who comments — *debet habere fundamentum doctrinae et perfectionem. Primum pertinent ad quemlibet; secundum vero pertinet ad praedicatores et doctores. Et sicut in aliis scientiis sunt principia, sic in hac sunt articuli fidei, quo innotescunt quilibet fideli secundum lumen infusum, et articuli sunt fundamenta fidei, quae est substantia rerum sperandarum. . . . Item requiritur perfectio doctrinae. Unde dicit: Et agnitionem veritatis.*[31]

It was this ideal of the teaching office which sent Saint Thomas to his knees in tears to implore the knowledge and grace for the mastership, because — and the words are his own — *impositum est mihi onus magisterii, ad quod scientia mea non sufficit.*[32] In his inaugural address when he received his master's cap, October 23, 1256, he made a great point

[24]Col. 1:19-20
[25]Col. 2:9-10
[26]Dan. 3:39
[27]John 6:69-70
[28]Cf. e.g., *Summa Theol.*, III, q. 37, a. 1 ad 2.
[29]*Epist. Apost. Unigenitus*, 19 Martii, 1924, (16 AAS, 133ff.).
[30]Tit. 1:1
[31]*Comment Ep. S. Pauli, in loco.*
[32]Fide Bertheir, *Doctor Communis*, (Rome, 1914), 10, n. 1.

of the dignity of the mastership; for the masters, *terrena contemnendo solis caelestibus inhiant . . . mentium splendorem primo recipiunt . . . in defensionem fidei debent esse contra errores . . . Omnes igitur doctores esse debent alti per vitae eminentiam, ut sint idonei ad efficaciter praedicandum . . . illuminati ut idonee doceant . . . muniti ut errores confutent . . .*[33] And he closed his address with humble acknowledgment that the master's talents are not themselves enough for the performance of the duties of the mastership, but his "sufficiency is from God,"[34] from whom it should be sought in prayer: "But if any of you is wanting in wisdom, let him ask it of God, who gives abundantly to all men, and does not reproach; and it will be given to him."[35] In the same spirit the venerable Humbert of Romans counselled the masters of the order: *Et notandum est quod boni doctoris est non solum studere sapientiam, ut sciat quod doceat; et non solum docere verbo vel scripto, ut instruat; sed et dare operam ut observetur quod dicit, ut proficiat. Quia vero non est seminantis, nec terrae seminatae fructum producere, sed Dei solius, ideo recurrit bonus doctor super hoc ad Deum per orationem.*[36]

The office of master is not a private affair. Christ the Master's truth is not for the student in an ivory tower, not only because *sicut maius est illuminare quam lucere solum, ita maius est contemplata aliis tradere quam solum contemplari,*[37] but especially because Christ the Master "gave some men . . . as teachers, in order to perfect the saints for a work of ministry, for building up the body of Christ, until we all attain to the unity of the faith and of the deep knowledge of the Son of God, to perfect manhood, to the mature fullness of Christ."[38] There is no time therefore for by-gone subtleties and dead controversies. Instead, as our Constitutions command: *Praecipue doceatur quomodo ex principiis et doctrina S. Thomae huius temporis problemata solvi possunt.*[39] Saint Dominic's apostolic ambition was to teach Christ's truth to the unlettered Cumans; Saint Thomas wrote his *Summa Theologiae* for beginners.[40] The Doctor of the Gentiles could write: "I had rather speak five words with my understanding that I also may instruct others, than ten thousand words in a tongue."[41] And they were also true disciples of the Master, Christ.

Weighing the requirements for the master's office and the responsibilities which go with it, the warning of St. James is understandable: *Nolite plures magistri fieri, fratres mei, scientes quoniam maius iudicium sumitis.*[42]

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[33]*Ibid.*
[34]II Cor. 3:5
[35]Jas. 1:5
[36]*Expositio Regulae B. Augustini* (Opera I, 592).
[37]*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 188, a. 6. See also *Constitutiones S.O.P.*, n. 3.
[38]Eph. 4:11-13
[39]*Constitutiones S.O.P.*, n. 665, § II.
[40]*Summa Theol.*, Prologus.
[41]Cor., 14:19
[42]Jas. 3:1

Your province has honorably fulfilled its duty of teaching the truth of Christ, the Master, in your missions and your parishes, by your preaching and your teaching, by your lectures to the Thomist Societies and by your writings, by published books and by reviews, among which a high place belongs to *Cross and Crown.* In the ministry of the truth your latest candidates for the magisterial dignity have no small part. Your provincial chapter commended them to your Master General as good ministers of Christ Jesus, nourished with the words of Christ and of the good doctrine which they have attained,[43] and today with ancient rite they receive the insignia of the mastership in sacred theology: the newest masters of the Order in a line which reaches to the archiepiscopal hall in Paris in the year 1230, when Brother Roland of Cremona, the first master from the Order, received his master's cap in the presence of the Chancellor of the University of Paris. Almost every trace of that ceremonial has unhappily disappeared from the universities, although fragments of it survive in different parts of Europe and it has been revived in a few places.[44] The Dominican Order, never forgetful of the dignity of the mastership in sacred theology, has kept the ancient ceremonial alive almost in its entirety and has retained the title of masters as distinctive of its theologians.[45]

We rejoice with Brother Leonard and Brother Sebastian on their birettation by which they receive the chief of the two insignia of the mastership, are recognized by their old masters, and are incorporated into the society of masters. As one of their ancient masters, I presume to take upon myself the prerogative of welcoming them to the society of masters and of hailing them with their newly-won title. May Brother Master Leonard and Brother Master Sebastian shine ever brighter in the firmament of sacred science.

May they make their students their debtors to whom they are in truth indebted for their title and honor of today. May they long continue to rear them "in the discipline and admonition of the Lord."[46]

And finally, my masters, through the tender solicitude of the Mother of our only one Master, the Christ, may His priestly prayer be heard for you and all of us: "Father . . . sanctify them in the truth."[47] Amen.

✠Edward C. Daly, O.P.
Bishop of Des Moines

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[43]Cf. I Tim 4:6-7
[44]Powicke and Emden, *op. cit.*, 1, 231.
[45]*Ibid.*, I, 19.
[46]Eph. 6:4
[47]John 1:1, 17

GUARDIANS OF THE TRUTH*

ON THE FEAST of the Immaculate Conception of last year, (1951) this chapel was the scene of an event notable in American Dominican history. It was the formal inaugural of the College of St. Rose of Lima as the house of theology of the Province of St. Albert the Great.

It was a memorable day. With His Excellency, the Most Reverend Archbishop Rohlman, metropolitan of the Province of Dubuque, presiding, Solemn Mass was pontificated by the Most Reverend Archbishop Binz. The Most Reverend Bishops of Iowa were present. The Most Reverend, Emmanual Suarez, Master General of the Order of Preachers, accompanied by two members of the Order's Curia, journeyed from Rome, especially to be in attendance. A masterly sermon was delivered by the Most Reverend Bishop Daly, Ordinary of the Diocese of Des Moines in which he explained the purposes of this Studium, in the light of the laws and the centuried educational traditions of the Church and the Dominican Order.

That ceremony brought us back to the beginnings of the Church in Iowa and the great Northwest Territory. Bishop Daly hailed those apostolic missioners and pathfinders of the faith, the saintly Matthias Loras and the marvelously versatile Friar Preacher, Samuel Mazzuchelli. It was a day embossed with sacred memories. For Father Samuel, it was indeed a day of triumph. After more than one hundred years his Dominican brethren, through the benevolence of our good friend and great benefactor, Archbishop Rohlman, were returning to a pulsating center of his pioneering labors for the faith. His highest devotion was to the Church. To the Church he gave himself in heroic measure and forever shall his name be linked with its founding and expansion in this division of God's vineyard.

Hardby the rendezvous of the great of generations past, ecclesiastical students, religious and diocesan, will be disciplined in spirituality and

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***REALITY here presents the sermon delivered by the Provincial of St. Albert's Province at St. Rose Priory last October, on the occasion of the investiture of the Very Reverend John A. Driscoll, Prior of St. Rose Priory, in the Masterate of Sacred Theology.**

divinity in preparation for their various roles in preserving and extending the faith. The work has begun with much promise to the Dominican Order and the Province of Dubuque.

Today is the occasion for another simple yet significant ceremony. It is the investiture of the Very Reverend John Alexius Driscoll, Prior of St. Rose Priory, the theological study house of the Dominicans of the Middle West, in the Masterate of Sacred Theology. The Masterate is the consummate academic distinction in the Order of Preachers. This highest recognition is accorded one for eminence in doctrine, exemplary religious observance, and the use of both for the advancement of the Catholic Faith. This official and public approbation ranks Father Driscoll with the very front line leaders of the doctrinal apostolate of the Order, as a teacher and defender of the faith, and associates his name with an illustrious galaxy of Friars Preachers of the Old World and the New.

The ceremony of December 8, 1951 awakened memories of Loras and Mazzuchelli, their sacrifices and achievements for the Church, religion Catholic education, and the commonweal. The ceremony this morning reaches back into the 13th century — more than seven hundred years ago. It summons before us no dead record of a glorious but vanished past. It recalls great events, a turning point in Christian history, the founding of a religious order, the projection of a revolutionary idea in the work of the Church, a radical change in the training of the Christian priesthood.

Before us rises Dominic Guzman, an ascetic Spanish Canon Regular, and with him the story of a providential mission for the good of the Church, a mission which has touched the life of the Church in every generation since and in all parts of the world.

It is no intent of ours to relate the story of his remarkable career save as it touches upon the ceremony of this day.

Dominic from his youth pursued an insatiable quest for divine truth. He became the intrepid mouthpiece of truth. Charity and chastity and poverty, it is true, shone in his life with the brilliant sheen of heaven. But truth was the unconquerable passion of his soul: truth he would seek unceasingly; truth he would possess with all the power of his being; rather he would be possessed by it that he might communicate it to others for their salvation. The fruition of his quest for truth was his apostolate, one of the most successful from apostolic times to the hour God summoned him to give light to the Church as a Doctor and Preacher of Truth and bring to the minds of men the changeless truth of God as expressed in the personality of Jesus Christ.

Dominic was a student with a profound sense of religion. His studious spirit made an indelible impress upon the Order he established. He had an extraordinary sympathy for his fellowmen and towards them he was lavishly generous. For their sakes, in his student days, he would sell his precious books; more, he would sell himself to redeem them from slav-

ery. In later life, he would even die a martyr's death to save them for Jesus Christ.

In 1203, special circumstances brought him to Languedoc, and there he received the awful shock which spelled the prelude to the work which has immortalized his name. At close range he beheld the frightful havoc wrought by the evils of the 12th century. Intellectual and religious unrest was prevalent in educated circles. In the universities, philosophical and theological speculation and controversy assumed a daring character and menaced not merely the teaching but the very life of the Church. The new thought of the East with its pagan philosophy and its relics of ancient heresies filtered through and undermined the faith of the prelates, priest, and people. Fanastic beliefs and practices coupled with an incredible fanaticism, utterly new to the western world, made their appearance for the first time. An infidel philosophy, freethinking rationalism, Manicheism and its offshoots, threatened not only the unity of Christendom, but all government and social order. The stark reality of the weakness of the Church in its representatives and children confronted and saddened him.

In one of the fairest gardens of God's Church the faith was decadent or dead because the doctrine of the Church was not properly studied and taught. The clergy proved derelict in their highest duty and in many instances joined ranks with the false prophets of that awful era. The people having migrated to the cities were cut off from the saving spiritual influences of the monks; they fell prey to the heresies of the hour, abandoned all religious practices and lived in misery, ignorance, and neglect. A decade of heartrending experience was his lot in Languedoc and France. It was a terrifying spectacle. The truth was unknown; it was not preached; worse still, it was sacrificed to the deception of numberless souls. Under the Providence of God, this pitiful plight of Christendom occasioned the birth of Dominic's apostolic mission. This was the apostolate of truth. "Having been defeated in Languedoc, hero though he was, he determined to conquer the world. He saw that the wound to be healed was not of a province but world-wide and world-deep."

Dominic saw that if heresy was to be conquered successfully, if the faith was to be upheld, learning and *great* learning was necessary. No longer would men be converted by mere holiness of life. A stream of learning had begun to flow from many sources. Men were asking questions never before heard. Negative or evasive answers were futile. What served the Moor in Spain should in no wise differ from that given the Albigensian in Languedoc, the free-thinker in Lombardy, or the heathen in Hungary. In a word, doctrine must be uniform, and uniformly vigorous. He saw that the disease was in the whole body and might anywhere and at anytime declare itself. The teaching of revealed truth must be accurate, clear, and widespread.

It has been said that the motto of St. Paul might well have been *Gratia Dei non est alligata.* His special work had been the universalizing

of the Gospel, in the sense of liberating the action of grace from the bondage of the law, and delivering it as the common heritage of all—Gentile, Jew and the whole human race. In following the apostolate of St. Paul, Dominic might have borrowed the motto: *Verbum Dei non est alligatum.* He conceived his mission of truth as beyond the need and limits of any single nation. His mission, and that of his Order after him, was to the whole world.

Dominic put his finger on the pulse of the times when he taught by word and example that fervent preaching and orthodox teaching cemented by holiness of life could alone save Christendom. He would found an Order of Preachers. So eager was Dominic to assuage the sorrows of the Church, to heal the wounds of Christendom, that with Apostolic boldness he sought jurisdiction to preach everywhere and without special delegation.

In the 13th century the expression *ordo praedicatorum* in its traditional meaning signified the whole body of bishops and prelates along with their delegates in the office of teaching the faithful. The bishop was and is the official preacher of a diocese; in so many sections in those days the bishop was both the official preacher and the only preacher to the faithful In an unprecedented move by the Church, permission was granted to Dominic to found an order of preachers, dedicated by the papacy to the ministry of preaching and sharing in the doctrinal apostolate of the Church.

Preaching is the official function of the Bishops as successors of the Apostles and of right belongs to them alone. Before St. Dominic's time priests were, under special circumstances, delegated to preach, but only in a restricted sphere. St. Dominic raised the preacher to a certain official participation in the doctrinal mission of the Bishops. Thanks to him, the preacher can lay a certain claim to the title of doctor; and to St. Dominic, not only his sons, but all priests owe an appreciation for the exercise of their mission.

Dominic would establish an order of able preachers, masters of doctrine, well instructed in the Sacred Books, convincing preachers of the truth. In keeping with his design he led his first associates to the University of Toulouse. At the time, Paris was Europe's center of learning. Therefore in Paris, he established a house—St. James, destined to be celebrated in history as the home and magnet of the best minds of the century. To Paris he sent his disciples to study and make their mark—as a host of them did, most famous of whom were Albert and Aquinas. At Bologna, too, noted for its University, would he have a house, to which hundreds of distinguished vocations were attracted.

Pugiles fidei, vera mundi lumina, "champions of the faith, true lights of the world." Celebrated words in Dominican history! They have inflamed the hearts of countless sons of Guzman with a divine-like eagerness to emulate the insipiring example of their Father in Christ and his

first disciples. How they must have stirred the heart of Dominic when first his eyes fell upon them, in the document issued by Pope Honorius III. Indicated therein, was the great confidence of the Vicar of Christ as he issued the charter for this new religious institute, dedicated irrevocably to preaching and the salvation of souls.

Intensely concerned about the organization of his Order, while at the same time strenuously engaged in the active apostolate, between the formal approbration by Rome and the hour when he died at the feet of his brethren in Bologna, a period of five years, there was little time for outlining in definite terms an educational system for the brethren. He did, however, breathe into his Order a holy ambition for intellectual leadership consecrated to the service of the Church. He had urged upon his followers intensive study of the Sacred Scriptures, the principal font of theological knowledge. Enrolling his first companions, priests well versed in theology, at the University of Toulouse, was no mere gesture. It was but the first step in a movement that within a century would make his sons the leading educators of the clergy in Europe. A scholarly personnel of more than seven hundred masters would hold chairs in Dominican conventual schools, universities, episcopal and monastic schools. They were the answer to an imperative need for adequate training of the clergy when authorities failed to execute the regulations of Lateran Councils.

Dominic sought to establish convents in the large univeristy centers, a plan followed faithfully by his successors. His dynamic influence made its ineffaceable imprint when Vincent of Beauvais formulated for a General Chapter a course of studies, which in the main is the basis of Dominican training today. This system, set up in 1228, confirmed by subsequent chapters of the Order, with little variation, carried out the ideas of Dominic with regard to the intellectual formation of students of the Order. Study became an integral part of their work, a sacred obligation upon every Friar Preacher. It would be an interesting and illuminating theme to consider the plan of the Studia, Studia Solemnia, and Studia Generalia as set up in this original *Ratio Studiorum.* At the moment, though, we direct our attention to the place of the Master of Theology in this revolutionary scheme for the training of the priests and candidates for the priesthood in preparation for the apostolate of truth.

The Master of Theology was the key figure, a dominant influence in the operation of the great plan. Paris, at the time was the center of theological study, and only at Paris could one win the cap and ring of the masterate. Thus, to the university of Paris, Dominic and his successors sent Friars deemed most apt for scholastic and teaching eminence. With the masterate attained they would be assigned to the Studia of the Order or wherever summoned by the authorities of the Church. And this to give the Church and the Order, priests of superior character and education.

And in time, in the words of a distinguished English Protestant student of Dominican annals, "although Paris became a great center of theological study we may venture to say that the Dominican Order even surpassed Paris in the completeness of its theological training." It is also worthy of note that the courses at the Dominican Studia were not limited to the members of the Order; clerics of dioceses, religious of other Orders, and even the laity sat at the feet of the Dominican Masters.

All this was the outgrowth of the labors Dominic had planned for his Order, the first religious family founded with an academic mission. And in this academic mission the Master of Theology played a conspicuous and fundamental part.

The basic plan of Dominican studies was drawn up by the Master, Vincent of Beauvais. Masters have protected its integrity through the centuries. "It was the aim of the brethren," wrote Cardinal Newman, "to form the whole matter of human knowledge into one harmonized system, to secure the alliance between religion and philosophy and to train men to the use of the gifts of nature in the sunlight of divine grace and revealed truth." That is the office of the Master, to teach, to train, to educate men for the apostolate of preaching. Masters have done and do many things of exceptional note, and their efforts have won acclaim for themselves and honor for the Order; but their primary obligation is to teach the truth to aspirants for the apostolic mission committed to the Friars Preachers.

Masters are the guiding lights, the inspirational inflences, the driving force in all academic movements and accomplishments within the Order. Few in number in any Province, they form a mighty, effective force for the execution in our day of the first purposes of Dominican life and action. They are in honor among us, for unhesitatingly we acknowledge our debt to them, individually and collectively. They are the guardians of a precious heritage. In a special sense, in the words of Pope Clement IV they are the "guardians of the truth," yes, the watch-dogs of the Lord. Their treasure is 'the word of wisdom.' They must ever be conscious, not of their dignity but rather of their responsibility to the Church and the Order. They are the elect of the apostolate of truth. They form an incomparable band in the Dominican Family. In hailing the candidate of today we salute the masters of yesterday.

There is universal applause for Father Driscoll in reaching the scholastic heights of our Dominican vocation. He has met with credit to himself and his province the most exacting requirements for this exceptional honor.

After graduate studies in Rome, concluded with uncommon merit, Father Driscoll has taught with splendid success for 21 years in the Studia of the Order. A devoted disciple of the Angelic Doctor, through these he has expounded the sound and saving principles of Catholic

philosophy and theology to the laity of the Middle West as well as students of the Order. As a co-founder of the Thomist Association, his progressive spirit and prudent administration have contributed much to the development to this instrument for the spread of Catholic truth among the laity of many communities. For many years he has exercised a telling influence in the Catholic Peace Association. The esteem and confidence of his brethren and superiors must be clear from the posts of responsibility they have chosen to fill. From our hearts and for all we sincerely and heartily congratulate Father Driscoll.

For him we pray years without number for "placing human wisdom at the service of divine faith that many walking the paths of his teaching may come to enjoy the perfect light of heaven."

Very Rev. Edward L. Hughes, O.P.
Provincial

A PEN FOR THE FRIAR*

IN THE CHRIST-LIKE TASK of telling the world the only good news it can ever hear, the Dominican plays a prominent role. Just what that role is and how he is to play it, his unofficial name of "Dominican" does not reveal. But consider his official title. He is a Friar Preacher. His name betrays him. He is one who by the duty entrusted to him by the Church must make Truth known.

The Friar Preacher casts his fire upon the earth by words and, in the language of his Constitutions, "scripto multiplici," by numerous writings.

"Numerous writings" are not chance productions. To turn out not one, or two, or three works, but many writings, is a job that requires ceaseless application and effort. But in what direction and along what lines should that application and effort be directed?

There are only two steps in the production of any literary work: thinking it out and writing it down.

Under the heading of thinking it out come deciding *why* you're writing, *what* you're going to say, and *how* you're going to go about saying it. Just to keep our terms straight we can borrow a few names from Father Farrell's sermon methodology, and call the *why* of the writing *the aim. What* and *how* we will combine under the name *proposition.*

The aim, or the why of your writing, can vary. You may be writing because you have been assigned an article to write. Most professional writers write to make money. Among literary artists the aim is to create a work of beauty which will produce a pleasant effect in the reader.

Usually the Christian writer is writing to produce an effect in his readers, too. He wants to change people, to strengthen them, to encourage or enlighten them. Unlike his competitors, the admen, he doesn't

***Editor's note: This article is intended to be a practical application of the theory of writing proposed by Father Walter Farrell, O.P., in "Mastery of Language," REALITY, Winter, 1952.**

want his readers to rush right down to the corner grocery store or to try a glass of the newest carbon-acidic compound. He wants them to rush to heaven, and to taste the waters of eternal life.

Upon the writer's aim will depend what he says and how he says it. Suppose you are writing because you have an assignment to turn in on Monday morning. Then usually what you say will have been decided by the person who made the assignment and you need concern yourself only with the problem of how to say it. The professional with his eye on the cash-register is determined by his market. He examines the magazines or the current best-sellers and wonders what the publishers will buy and how they'd like to have it said. The literary artist decides what emotion will best achieve the effect he wants to produce and then he considers how to arouse that emotion.

The Christian writer is in much the same position as the literary artist. His aim can be as vague as, say, "to convert people." Then he asks, "What shall I say to change them?" He narrows his field, if he wants to write anything at all, until he's got down to something as positive and concrete as he can, for instance, "to get these people to confession." If that is his aim, then his proposition might be expressed this way: "To show the ugliness of sin."

But still his aim is too vague. He could write for a million years about "the ugliness of sin." The horror of sin is expressed only in the concrete. He would do better to have as his aim, "to show some of the effects of sin," and for his proposition, "by showing Christ's suffering." He may come up with something like Gerald Vann's, *The Pain of Christ.*

How he says what he has to say will depend on his own personality, the audience he is writing for, and the writing style he has acquired during his years of practice.

Most of the work of writing consists in thinking out the idea. That is the part of the writer's work that makes his life seem so attractive to his non-writing neighbors.

"Ah, that Jones there. He has the life. Writer, you know. Writes for four hours a day and the rest of the time he's free to do anything he pleases."

Usually the writer "pleases" to dine on his own fingernails, stare at the floor and walk in rapid, tight little circles while he talks to himself about his latest literary project. In one of his early circles, the writer asks himself, "What do I intend to accomplish by my writing?" And when he gets an answer, he has an aim.

The aim, although it never appears in print, should be stated as concisely and clearly as possible. A well-defined aim limits the effort which will go into the rest of the work. It stops all thinking, reading, writing, researching, and planning which are not directly to the point. It is the most important element in the entire process of writing for

acquiring the indispensable qualities of unity, coherence, and clarity of thought. If he has an aim before he starts to write, the writer can ask of everything as he goes along, "Does this accomplish my aim?" When the answer is, "No," then, no matter how entertaining the particular thought may be, it will detract from the unity of his composition and must be left out. The only way for the writer to make sure that everything he says will be to the purpose is to have a purpose.

The writer further insures unity and coherence in his work by a positive and clear statement of the proposition. The statement of the proposition is the answer to the writer's second query, "What am I going to say to achieve my aim?"

There will be a lot of things you can say to fulfill the aim you have in writing. For instance, one day Edgar Allen Poe decided that he wanted to produce in the souls of his readers ". . . a novel, first, and secondly a vivid effect." Now there are very many things that a writer can say if all he wants to do is produce a novel and vivid effect. But he can choose only one of them.

Poe chose to achieve his effect by arousing the emotion of sadness. He decided to write a melancholy poem. He next asked himself what was the most melancholy thing he could think of (which seems to have occupied a considerable part of his time anyway) and how to create an atmosphere of melancholy in its telling. He settled upon the mourning of a lover for his beloved departed as the most melancholy thing he could think of, and upon the device of a repeated refrain of a single word as a suitably melancholy way of going about the telling. Thus, by a kind of ingenious necessity, Poe found himself compelled to write *The Raven.* With the ideas he had and the methodical way he went at it, there was nothing else he could do.

When you have a clear and definite aim and a concrete statement of the proposition, you have accomplished the major part of the work of thinking out your writing. You know why you are writing, and what you are going to write. Now all you have to do is to write it. Like a summer vacationer poring over maps and folders, you have selected a resort and have chosen the route you will follow to get there. Provided you stick to your good intentions and the car doesn't break down, you will infallibly arrive at the seashore.

But before you begin the work of actual writing you must determine each of the points that will establish what you want to say. Your idea is still general. There is yet much pondering to be done before you actually set pencil to paper. The poet who has decided that he is going to write a melancholy poem must do a great deal of work before he cashes his publisher's check.

This is the work of outlining. Every paragraph that you write will express a single thought. The topic sentence of each paragraph should appear on the outline. This is necessary to insure coherence and to pre-

vent the introduction of extraneous matter which will destroy unity. It is always easier on the writer's nervous system to tear up an incoherent outline rather than an incoherent article or book.

Now the bitter task of writing begins. You have settled upon what you are going to say; you have conceived a whole. And a whole, says Aristotle, has beginning, middle, and end.

What do you suppose is usually the last thing to be written? That's right, the introduction is. To avoid talking in circles around your subject while you try to begin, wasting time and effort, begin with the main part of the article. After you have finished the whole thing you can go back and write a short beginning.

A good beginning must capture the attention of the reader. To do that it has to be short, interesting, dramatic, and easy to read. Remember that it has to capture; seize violently and hold by force. That means that a good beginning must be short. Many people will read the first paragraph of a story idly to see if it is worth their while. If the first paragraph seems interesting they will read the second. And if the second paragraph is the start of the body of the article they are likely to read all the rest simply to see how it comes out.

But if the beginning is longer and a whole in itself, with a definite break between it and the body, the reader may be satisfied with it and never go on to read the rest. The beginning has to be open, to be unfinished, to require that something come after it. It takes a strong man to stop reading when his interest has been aroused and his curiosity is unsatisfied. The beginning should pose a question, or somehow pique the reader's curiosity and then flow naturally into the body of the article.

As an introduction it should lead into the thought you are going to develop in the main part of the article. But in most writing today the function of the beginning as an attention-getter is more emphasized, just as the quietly swaying boot that once proclaimed the unassuming presence of the colonial cobbler shop, if anybody was looking for one, has been replaced by a winking neon brogan 12 feet high *that actually kicks you!*

Not unexpectedly, the function of the conclusion is to end the article. It should end it too, and not prolong the agony. A writer who thinks of fifteen good ending sentences and then proceeds to use them all is like the man who cut off the tail of his dog a little at a time because he didn't want to hurt the animal. A good conclusion should be short. By the time the reader realizes that the article is coming to an end it should be ended. For a writer to continue writing after he has drawn his conclusion to a climax, is as futile as a teacher teaching after he has picked up his books.

It is often effective for the conclusion to sum up the whole article as concisely as possible and to present it as forcefully as possible. As a summation it must be consistent with the rest of the article and not begin

something new. As an end there should be a note of finality about it so that the reader will not be led to expect something more. The best of all conclusions, when it can be used, is the simple statement of the proposition.

But of course no matter how important the introduction and conclusion may be, when you come down to it their whole *raison d' etre* is the body of the paper. The body is where you tell your readers what you have come to tell them. It is usually the easiest of the whole article to write, despite its prominent importance.

In the work of writing the body of the article the writer must take care to be coherent. Coherence depends upon the connectedness of thought. Provided that the aim has been clearly stated and kept in mind while the work of outlining was being done, the theme will be logical and each new idea will follow in its proper order. But, as Aristotle suggests, reasoning is a spiritual act; its steps happen simultaneously, and so it is always going to be better than its written or spoken expression. One danger, then, is that the author is going to refuse to bow to the relentless demands of time and space. He is liable to fall into the sin of trying to say everything at once. At the very least when he has a message that he is eager to deliver he is in danger of leaping from peak to peak of his thought like a mountain goat.

In his hurry to get his thought on paper the writer is liable to state only his conclusions, and those not too clearly, without giving any of his reasons for drawing them. A want of premises of some sort or other will cause the composition to be disconnected. We think logically, right enough, but too often we fail to put down the linking steps in our thought processes. Such a failure results in incoherence, the besetting sin of madmen. An incoherent writer would do better to say it with flowers than with binding, inflexible words.

But deciding precisely what premises to use, what links to forge with and which to keep to yourself is a work of some nicety. Certainly not every step should be taken on paper; only the ones that are necessary. You must not take giant strides, but neither should you stitch your thought so tightly that it doesn't move at all. The reader should never see the underside of your tapestry of thought, where all the cross threads, the doubts, hesitations, wonderings and wanderings are visible. Show him only the smooth-textured upper surface, whereon the thought is pictured sharp and clear. Don't talk your next move over with yourself on paper. Don't think with your pencil.

The thought must flow so smoothly that the motion while swift will be hardly perceptible. The reader must never, therefore, become aware of gaps in the thought. Unconnected sentences are as jarring as dropping dishes in a restaurant or as dogs in church.

In general, the method which should be employed to unfold the thought logically will be evident from the content of what you are writing.

When you have conceived a real whole, with a logical starting point and goal, you automatically impose a kind of necessity upon the matter to be developed in a certain way. It is the skill of the writer which must make that order seem so right that the reader is never baffled or confused.

When the sun of the writer's intellect is shining brightly, each sentence will cast a shadow before it that is an accurate image of the substance which is to follow after. In a well constructed composition every sentence will demand a certain thought to follow. The writer must see that it does.

The logical connection between paragraphs is often shown by the use of connective words, such as: moreover, also, nevertheless, and a few other work-horses. If the idea has been thought out beforehand and the paragraphs really are the logical development of the theme, then their connection will be apparent upon the simple condition that the thought of each is clearly expressed.

Within the paragraphs themselves, there are various ways to develop the single thought of which the paragraph is the expression. Reiteration of the topic is effective but dangerous, because without great care it can be monotonous. Readers can become bored with the constant repitition of the same motif just as seawashed rocks are unimpressed by the single point the waves keep making.

Illustration through particular, concrete examples is most satisfactory for persuasive, vivacious writing. "Who is my neighbor?" asked the lawyer. He could have been told in a word or two, but never so forcefully as he was shown by the story of the Good Samaritan. Using comparison and contrast, enumerating details, discussing cause and effect are all good methods for developing a single theme. They all are used in the gospel story of Lazarus and Dives.

Thought is inseparable from the words in which it is clothed. What is usually meant by style is simply the manner in which the thought is expressed. Above all the author's purpose is to communicate his thought to his readers. To do that his expression must be clear. To please his readers his style must also be to some extent beautiful.

So there remains for the writer's consideration the choice of the proper words. But the proper words for clarity are not always the longest or most uncommon, or even the most beautiful. Clear words are words whose meaning is fully and surely grasped, and the first person who has to grasp it is the writer. He has to be sure of his words.

In choosing his words the writer has a fine-sounding treasure to select from. He can stud his composition with mindless gauds like a pirate bejeweled in his booty, or he can select only the single right word and wear his diamond like a gentleman. The author who is trying to communicate his thought as precisely and perfectly as he can will pick only words whose meaning is plain and which exactly fit the concept to be

expressed. The goal he must strive for is to employ the best word in common use.

The people who determine the meaning of words are the people who use them: writers and speakers. The author who is to have an apt and accurate command of words must notice carefully how other writers use them and what they mean by them. He can gain that knowledge only by seeing words used. He must read.

By reading the beautiful masterpieces in the English language the aspiring writer can see how well things can be said. By browsing with the literary great he can learn how words can be used effectively. But the language of today is not the language of yesterday. English is a living language, and there is, moreover, a strong and vigorous American tongue that is the medium of modern writers in our own country. That means that the young writer has to read both the great masters of the past and those who write today.

That doesn't mean that the student-writer has to drop his textbooks and take up Shakespeare or that he has to take out a subscription to the Daily Gazette. It does mean that in all his reading the student-writer should pay careful attention to the way his confreres use words and what those words connote. In the quiet moments when there may be time for relaxed reading it is helpful to read the masterpieces. In required reading, if there is a choice, the student-writer should choose the better written and notice why it is. In all his reading he must read the best. That is all there is time for.

When what you read is not well written, find out why it isn't and try to improve upon it. Intelligent attention to style and use of words in all your reading can teach you the mechanics of writing, can stimulate you to produce like results and can develop in you a reverence and feeling for words.

Before a writer can market his article it has to be interesting. Another function of style is to garb the author's thought in pleasing dress and thus make it more readily acceptable. A pleasing manner of expression will be interesting, forceful, and graceful.

To sustain interest, the sentence structure should be as varied as possible while still retaining coherence. Scatter short sentences among long ones. Often it helps interest to begin sentences with phrases or to invert their customary order of subject, verb and object. If an order is adopted that builds to a climax which is withheld until the end of the paragraph the interest of the reader is further stimulated.

When you have a thought that you want to strike forcefully put it as concisely as you can; the shorter the sentence the better. In that way the reader will receive the full impact at one blow and will not anticipate the thought. "But who do you say that I am? . . . Thou art the Christ, the son of the living God."

For grace and ease of expression, as well as for forceful expression, there must be economy of words. If you could express the idea in a single word it would be forceful, perhaps, but hardly graceful. But you can use the fewest possible words.

For thrift in words be sure to see that the words you use express your thought truly. Do not modify your thought to fit the words you find easiest to reach. For if you do you will find yourself dissatisfied and making several attempts until you hit upon the proper expression that precisely communicates your idea.

Nor should the linguistic economist use clichés to avoid precise thinking or to fill up an unbalanced sentence. However, common phrases are not to be scorned completely. They often afford rest for the reader like a familiar landmark in unfamiliar surroundings. Even when they cannot be used in that way, the writer may sometimes obtain good, original results from an intelligent analysis and rephrasing of trite sayings and aphorisms. Generally the maxims of our language express keen insights into life in common sense terms, but their force has been dulled by repitition, and neither writer nor reader troubles to think about them.

Sometimes the writer uses a hackneyed phrase because it is the customary thing to say in this particular context. When the reader sees it his mind doesn't even register it. Both writer and reader suppose themselves to understand its meaning, so they never stop to consider what has really been said. But were the writer to turn the full gaze of his intellect upon some such statement as, "a rolling stone gathers no moss," and express what he sees there in fresh language, he might find himself gaining in insight into human nature and the nature of things.

Still another device to avoid cluttering an article with useless words is to use active constructions instead of passive ones. Try saying, "He spent a sleepless night," rather than, "A sleepless night was passed by him."

Use adjectives and adverbs to modify, instead of phrases, if you want your thought to move rapidly, smoothly, and easily. "A brown-felt hat" is a more compact expression than, "A hat of brown-felt."

Use possessive words and not possessive phrases. "Holy Name Headquarters," rather than, "Headquarters of the Holy Name Society." "John's book" says the same thing as, "the book of John," but it says it far less awkwardly.

It is said that a story could be told and never any words used but verbs. That may not be true, but certain it is that the same story can be told in fewer words by using the proper verbs. Use a verb that has its modifyers self-contained. "The robin flew swiftly from her nest," might more economically be put, "The robin darted from her nest." Tell about the shadowy figure "skulking" about the darkened warehouse, rather than saying that a man loitered in a suspicious manner.

Having an aim and a clear statement of the proposition can give unity and selectivity to your composition, and thinking out the theme in ad-

vance can give it coherence. But it will not make you a writer. For the fledgling author there is no substitute for the practice of actual writing.

A study of the life story of any successful writer reveals that the early days of a writer's career are always painfully spent in acquiring the writing habit. Graham Greene, to name but one successful modern author, filled copybook after copybook with stories from the time he was twelve; today he fills bookstores. Nathaniel Hawthorne became a great writer when his ordinary means of livelihood failed him and he was forced to turn to the task of writing to earn enough money to live. The great natural talent of these men was developed, then, not without effort. While practice may not make geniuses of the less gifted, still it can make good craftsmen.

"A promising writer is one who writes, and writes, and writes. He writes when he doesn't have to." That is the secret of becoming a writer.

While you write, and write, and write get help and instruction from the great writers who have gone before you. Take an exemplar of good writing, something generally recognized as such, and write your practice exercise following the same constructions used in your model. You will be in good company, for by just such slavish methods as that the finest writers in the language acquired their style. In addition, such an exercise provides an opportunity for extraordinarily close and careful reading.

Set yourself problems in your fifteen minute drills. For acquiring variety, try to start every sentence with a different construction. Practice description. Describe someone's face, describe the room you write in. Write dialogue, write narration. Practice telling stories.

But have an aim. Strive to maintain unity. Develop your idea as clearly and coherently, as logically as possible.

Use particular examples instead of general, vague expressions. Never mind saying, "He lived with great holiness of life." Instead tell about him finding a man set upon by robbers, binding up the victim's wounds, and bringing him to an inn. The readers will get the idea. They have, ever since the gospels were written.

When the time comes for serious work and you have finished the impossible task of writing a complete article, read it. You may have to tear it up and start over. Certainly you will have to rewrite it. Write and rewrite and rewrite again. Remember that the well-written paper is not the one which never needed rewriting; it is the one on which the rewriting has been done. It is the paper on which you have worked and worked until there is no more work to do.

One test to discover if the paper has been sufficiently rewritten is to read it over. If upon re-reading, it still sounds good to you the chances are that you have not yet re-worked it enough. Rewrite, phrasing more clearly, making transitions and relations plainer, using a more decisive word here, an active word there, picture words wherever you can.

Don't be afraid to cut and cross-out and tear-up. St. Augustine's admonition about not concealing wounds through fear of the knife applies in this instance too. Never inflict the wounds of your careless writing upon the minds of your readers.

Now read your composition again. What! you can not? When you are fatigued and weary from the work of rewriting and the very sight of your paper leering at you from the typewriter repells you, it may be safe to stop. For when it seems to you that the article is in the worst possible style and that every word lacks life, then you have probably rewritten it sufficiently. By the time that an article is ready for print you should have traced over and over the words so often and so deeply that beneath them a little bit of your soul shows through.

Does it sound discouraging and tiresome? Well, it is.

It is a strenuous business, this writing, and a business that takes time. Time is the coin with which a writer buys his books, and there is no other. It is a great price he pays, but it is the price that is demanded if his work is to have value.

If a Friar Preacher writes, but does not say what he is supposed to say, or if he writes in a manner that is not understandable, or if no one is moved by his words, then all the time he has saved will avail him nothing. He will have joined the dim ranks of those who have failed. "You are the light of the world. So let your light shine as to be seen."

There it is, a good method of writing. Not very enlightening, is it? All we have said is: decide why you are writing, decide how you are going to achieve your mark, and then sit down, begin to write, write, and conclude. But now we can let you in on a little secret.

"Writers kid themselves—about themselves and other people. Take the talk about writing-methods. Writing is just work—there's no secret. If you dictate, or use a pen, or type, or write with your toes—it is still just work."

The important thing to keep in mind is to have a purpose clearly in view before you write and to determine the whole scheme of the writing beforehand. Then set to work, keeping your eye on the goal and making sure that every word is pointed at it. Remember that when you are not aiming at the mark you are aiming away from it and so you cannot possibly hit it.

> "What is well thought is clearly uttered
> And the words to say it come easily."

Really that is all there is to writing. Think it out and write it down. And as for becoming a writer, writing it down is the important part. It is the specific difference that marks off the writer from every other person in the world.

Isn't it obvious? A writer is one who writes.

Humbert Crilly, O.P.

CORNERSTONE OF WISDOM

ABOVE A BIRDLESS SKY, across a shoreless ocean, beyond the farthest planet, over the edge of the universe, and still he hasn't found it. He returns to his manual of metaphysics and reads again the description of this *being* for which he has been searching: immaterial, in the third degree of abstraction, analogously abstracting from infinite and finite, from substantial and accidental, from potential and actual. The student reacts as does one who is witnessing a great drama: his only regret is that he missed the first act.

An account of the first act of metaphysics should add significantly to an appreciation of the whole, for as Aristotle mentions in the Politics, "He who considers things in their first growth and origin will obtain the clearest view of them." In order to obtain the simplest, clearest view of the birth of metaphysics we shall see it through the eyes of a true philosopher, a man who not only shares with all other men a natural desire to know, but who has made this thirst for truth his explicit trademark.

Despite his lofty vocation, the philosopher, like many great men, starts life in humble surroundings. His first steps down the road of knowledge are blind and wobbly indeed, but gradually they take on strength and direction, until they stand on the highway of science. Following the rigid signposts the philosopher finds the science of physics. There he is able to unite all natural bodies and consider them under the aspect of their moveability. He seeks to understand moveable being, or being as moveable. This moveability is the form of the subject of natural philosophy, whose boundary is the demonstration of the necessary existence of a first mover who is unmoved.

To the philosopher it seems like the end of the line. And he has valid reasons for momentary despair. The key to his ultimate understanding of the changeable world lies somehow further on, but physics has gone about as far as it can go. The absurdity of attempting to understand this immoveable being with the aid of physics is apparent, since it would involve the pursuit of the immoveable under the aspect of moveability. But there must be some way of knowing this first mover, be-

cause it is not only a new type of being, but also because it is the ultimate cause of physical change.

So here is one implication of the demonstration of the existence of this immoveable being: a desire kindled in the philosopher to know this new type of being.

Another implication is discovered by reflecting on moveable being and realizing that precisely because an immoveable being does exist, it follows that being and moveability are not the same either in extension or comprehension. Being and moveable are distinct perfections because they can be separated, as they are in the immoveable being who cannot be moved. Therefore, the mind is able to penetrate more deeply into the being it has been studying in physics and find a new intelligibility, the formality of being as being. Upon the discovery of this new knowable object follows a desire to know.

The mind expresses the truth of this discovery by a negative judgment: *being as such is not moveable being,* because a being does exist which is not moveable. This judgment of the intellect, the technical name for which is separation, loosens being from its identity with moveable being and enables being to be considered precisely as such.

Since this separation is a spiritual activity, the philosopher decides to freeze it and slice it thin in order to comprehend its meaning fully.

The climax of general physics is the proposition: there exists a first mover, a being which is itself unmoved; or, this being, the first mover, is not moveable.

Therefore, not all being is moveable.

Therefore, moveability is not an essential characteristic of being.

Therefore, the essential characteristic of being and the essential characteristic of moveable being are distinct.

Therefore, the being of moveable being is distinct from the moveability of moveable being.

Therefore, moveable being as being is a distinct formality from moveable being as moveable.

In this list of propositions there are only three which are distinct:

1) *This being* (the first mover) *is not moveable;* this is the termination of physics, a judgment on a particular being attained by a physical demonstration.

2) *Not all being is moveable:* this is the beginning of metaphysics, a judgment on all being, what can be called the primary separation of being.

3) *Moveable being, as being, is not* (is distinct from) *moveable being, as moveable;* this judgment is the result of the application of the primary separation to moveable being, what can be called the secondary separation of being.

So far, the philosopher has discovered two new realities: the first mover, and moveable being as being. Following each discovery he elicited a desire to know. The problem that now confronts him is *how* he can know them.

There is no way in which the philosopher is able to contact the first mover immediately, since it is in now way sensible. The only information he has of the first mover is that it exists, that is is the first cause of sensible motion, that in the exercise of this causality it remains uncaused, and therefore that it is separated from matter and motion. But these facts do not exhaust the avenues of approach open to scientific inquiry. Having established the existence of the first mover, our undaunted philosopher realizes that if he can determine the nature of being, what it means to exist, he will be able to know something of the first mover. Indeed, he concludes, after studying the other facts, that this is the only way open to him.

But how can he determine the nature of being? Only by studying moveable being as being, a distinct consideration from that of its moveability. The former is a focusing on being formally, precisely, and only as being. Since the essential characteristic of *to be* has no necessary relation to or dependence on *to be moveable,* this concept of being which is grasped by a consideration of moevable being as being can be said to be separated from matter and motion inasmuch as it can exist without matter and motion, although it actually happens to be in matter and motion.

This type of separation is very different from the manner in which the first mover is said to be separated from matter and motion, The first mover not only actually does exist without matter and motion, but also never could exist in matter and motion.

In this way the philosopher finds the entrance he has been seeking. Because both moveable being as being and the first moved can be separated from matter and motion, moveable being as being provides him with the medium by which he can know the first mover. But because of the diverse ways in which they are separated their unity or community or analogous.

Now moveable being as being has assumed the two-fold characteristic of being something knowable in itself and also the medium by which the first mover can be known by analogy. This concept of moveable being as being is called common being because it is the result of the merging of two intentions, the incorporation of two desires of the philosopher:

1) *the desire to know the first mover,* under which aspect common being is considered as the medium of analogous knowledge of the first mover;

2) *the desire to know mobile being as being,* under which aspect common being is considered as something knowable in itself.

These two intentions of the philosopher do not enjoy equal significance. His primary desire is to know the first mover, since that was his first discovery, and since the other is naturally apt to serve as the medium for which he had been searching. Therefore, common being as a medium is his principal concern, since his ultimate purpose is to attain some knowledge of the first mover. However, in the order of execution the philosopher is aware that he must first study common being in itself in order to garner the material for his analogous investigation of the first mover.

This characteristic of primacy in plurality, of subordination in coordination, of the principal among many, so permeates common being that it will be the principle by which the philosopher will solve the problems of the analogous significations of common being considered in itself.

This concept of common being is the subject genus of the human science and wisdom of metaphysics. Common being can also be called being as such or being as being, since it is the formality of existence through which the metaphysician views reality.

Perhaps the most confusing title conferred on common being is immaterial. Immediately upon hearing this, we are tempted to strain our eyes to catch a glimpse of some ethereal entity. The philosopher has only to reflect again on his judgment by which he grasped common being to understand the sense in which common being is said to be immaterial. It is not immaterial in a positive, but rather in a negative sense, that is, it does not necessarily imply matter, and so can be understood without matter.

The philosopher attained this concept of common being by a negative judgment called separation, which depends for its objective validity upon a demonstration in physics of the existence of an immobile first mover. This concept has two characteristics which even in the concept's still imperfect state give an indication of the general method of procedure in metaphysics. From now on we shall watch the evolution and development of common being as it undergoes a process of refinement by the application of this distinction which is a property of being, namely, the principal among many. The vastness of the extent of metaphysics allows this to be but a hasty sketch of the whole, but at least a healthy beginning will have been made.

After the philosopher has made the separation of being, he must now begin to investigate common being in itself.

The first thing to be determined about the subject of a science is its definition. But *being* does not lend itself to definition either strictly, that is, by means of a genus and specific difference, since it has no genus above it; or less strictly, that is, by description through something other than itself, since outside of being there is only nothing. However, the philosopher is at least able to resolve being into its constitutive elements of a subject which has existence.

Clutching this rather opaque, but nevertheless certain, definition of being, the philosopher resorts to division, hoping that this "way of knowing" will yield more than he was able to find by definition. He is aware that being is the most universal of all predicates, so if he can exclude by division some types of being it would be a great help.

At first glance, it seems to him that he can certainly exclude *per accidens* being, that which is incidental or contingent, since no science is concerned with what is *per accidens* (accidental to its subject) but rather with what is *per se* (essential) and necessary. *Per se* being has real unity, necessity, determined causes and properties, and hence is capable of being known scientifically. *Per accidens* being has no real unity, necessity, or determined causes. It can be described as the incidental unity of *per se* beings. Such a unity may be catastrophic or utterly insignificant, but whatever it is, no proper and proximate cause can be assigned to explain it. It is being in name only. For these reasons the philosopher decides that he is justified in ignoring *per accidens* being.

But almost immediately he sees that it cannot be completely overlooked. Since there are those who assert that all is determined, the fact that *per accidens* being occurs has some significance. For although *per accidens* being has no determined proximate cause, nevertheless, in the context of its ultimate cause it has some necessity, because it is necessary that *per acidens* being be *per accidens* and not *per se.* So although *per accidens* cannot be totally discarded, at least the philosopher can relegate it to a position of secondary importance. He can exclude it from his principal consideration, which is to determine the nature of being.

Still trying to narrow down the scope of his investigation, the philosopher turns his attention to that being which is the product of the judgment. Its *to be* or *is* signifies the composition of a proposition which the intellect makes by composing and dividing. This mental being is born when the intellect understands two concepts as being one, inasmuch as some unity is made out of them. Since this being is made by the intellect it pertains to the subject of the science of logic. Hence the philosopher is able to exclude it from his principal consideration, since it is purely incidental to real *per se* being that a judgment be made upon it.

When the philosopher has excluded *per accidens* being and logical being from the scope of his principal consideration, he is left with *per se* being outside the mind. He finds that this being can be divided in two ways. The first division is into substance and accidents, according as a thing can have existence independently of a subject or dependently.

Substance and accidents both enjoy the character of *per se* being, yet at the same time accidents are totally dependent on substance for their existence. Seeing this, the philosopher concludes that he can sufficiently determine the nature of being by studying substance, since it has existence in its own right. This does not mean the total exclusion of a consideration

of accidents, but rather an emphasis on the philosopher's primary concern, his principal endeavor. The terminology used by St. Thomas to describe this two-fold signification of common being is *communiter* and *principaliter* (or *id de quo est principalis intentio.*) *Communiter* refers to common being as it embraces the totality of the extension of metaphysics by analogy of proper proportionality; *principaliter* refers to common being as regards its principal signification, substance, by analogy of attribution. It is only in the relations of substance and accidents that this distinction is perfectly fulfilled, since in the other instances there was no true analogy.

The last division of *per se* being is according to act and potency. By this time the philosopher has no difficulty in applying this distinction. It is obvious that he will be more principally concerned with being in act. Again, however, it is not a case of exclusion but of subordination.

Having determined the principal signification in each division of being, the philosopher is able to weave them together and establish as the most principal of all, being which is *per se,* not *per accidens,* real, not logical, substantial, not accidental, and actual, not potential. He is most principally concerned with actually existing substance.

It is in analyzing this being that he discovers the real distinction between essence and existence as constituting the nature of common being. Then he goes on to seek the source of this "received" existence and arrives through demonstration as a being whose essence is his existence, a being who does not *have,* but *is* existence, a being whom he calls God.

Bonaventure Lamm, O.P.

A REFUTATION OF SUBJECTIVISM

DESPITE THE TESTIMONY of modern philosophy, it seems incredible that any sound-thinking individual could claim to be an out and out idealist, could profess to know ideas and not things. On second thought, perhaps the word incredible is too strong. That there be idealists is "incredible" only to those who have failed to see the difficulties involved when one attempts to lay open for examination the problem of knowledge. If, after thorough investigations one winds up an idealist, it is certainly unfortunate, but not incredible.

Strictly speaking, the word "idea" signifies something intellectual and hence an idealist is one who claims that the only certain reality is that of his own intellectual thoughts. On the other hand, there have been and are many who deny intellectual knowledge as distinct from sense knowledge, maintaining that they know not ideas, but only sensations and images. It all amounts, however, to the same thing, making knowledge, be it sense, intellectual, or both, rather than *being* the reality which we know. In general, this doctrine is what we call subjectivism, and its adherents subjectivists.

Detectives tell us that one of the best methods of solving the "how it happened" of a given case, is to re-enact the crime. Since many crimes have been committed in philosophy – and surely subjectivism is one – there seems to be no reason why we cannot adopt this method. This then is the purpose of our study: by re-enacting the philosophical crime of subjectivism, to find out how it happened, and why it happened, and, in pointing out why it happened, to show why it should not have happened.

St. Thomas refutes the errors involved in the subjectivist doctrines, first by a negative argument, in which the absurdity of their position is considered, and secondly, in a more positive manner, by discussing the impressed species as a principle *by which* the knowing subject contacts reality. Furthermore he emphasizes the fact that the impressed species is known only reflexively, the thing of which the impressed species is a

similitude being that which is immediately and directly known.[1] We shall follow a similar pattern. Also, because subjectivism admits of two types, and the crime can be committed in one of two ways, or, if you like, in both, we shall divide our paper into two parts. The first part will take up subjectivism as it pertains to sense knowledge, the second in its intellectual aspect. As might be expected we must necessarily deal in generalities. This is due not only to the usual "time" and "space" handicaps under which we labor, but also to the very nature of our subject matter. The species of subjectivism keep pace with the number of subjectivists. It is difficult to keep up with them. Nor is this hard to understand. For St. Thomas cautioned that when one makes his own thoughts the stuff of reality, there are as many realities as there are knowing subjects.[2] Furthermore, our treatment of this problem is more superficial than profound. Still, since many of the so-called great philosophers have spent their whole lives scratching the surface, thinking they had reached the depths, we deem it an achievement to scratch the surface and to *know* it is only the surface.

We said we intended to re-enact a crime. Here is how it starts. Subjectivists, like other people, always took it for granted that they knew things; but one day, unlike most people, they decided to analyze this business of knowing. Unfortunately for them, this was fatal; yet we must admit, it was praiseworthy enough. You cannot blame a man for trying. They first realized, and rightly too, that knowledge consisted in a union wherein the knowing subject contacted the things he knew by drawing them in to himself.[3] This was accomplished by means of impressions or sensations, caused in the knower by the things outside. This seemed logical. How could one ever hope to get to the third floor (the things outside) unless by passing through the second (sensations)? Suddenly, however, they realized this example limped, and limped badly. Knowledge could never get to the third floor. Every time it tried it ran smack up against the second. Every time the knower reached out to grab a piece of reality, his sensations intervened. Try (in vain) as he might he could not get beyond them. He was unable to set them aside, to discard them in his frantic attempt to seize the real. They stood between him and the things he wanted to know. Without them he could not know; with them they were all he could know.

And so the ordinary everyday expression about knowing things was not correct. It had failed a penetrating investigation. What we know

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[1]St. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae,* (Trans. by the English Dominican Fathers; New York: Benziger Brothers, 1947), I, q. 85, a. 2. All further references to the *Summa* will be taken from this edition.

[2]*Loc. cit.*

[3]In our everyday life, we receive the forms of other things in two ways: a) *naturally* (materially, subjectively, physically), by making them into our own forms so that they become part of us (*habere formam alterius sed non ut alterius*); e.g., as when we eat; b) *intentionally* (immaterially, objectively, psychically), by not making them into our own forms, but rather by leaving them as they are, by receiving them precisely as they are the forms of *other* things (*habere formam alterius ut alterius*), as in knowledge. Because of this reception of forms of other things *as other,* we say that immateriality is the root of knowledge.

are our own sensations, our own subjective modifications. These in turn tell us of a reality, of a world of beings. Still, when our senses spoke to us of this world of things could we be certain they were telling us the truth? If reality, in order to be known, had to put on something of the knower, how could we ever be sure of what it was in itself? If we can never leave our sensations behind and get at the real-in-the-nude, is it not somewhat boastful, even hypocritical — it is not scientific — to say we are certain of things?

This is how it happened and afterwards it was every man for himself. The standard was no longer whatever is, is true, but rather whatever seems to be, is true. The only question now was how far to go. There was no stopping a man if he cared to go all the way. The more logical subjectivists did. Berkeley denied everything but Berkeley. It would be correct to say, however, that the majority of the subjectivists, and this holds for our contemporaries, were content to strive to debunk what science covets most — objective certitude. Who is to say what actually is and what actually is not? Whatever the knowing subject says is, is. Whatever he says is not, is not. If our thoughts tell us of a reality, then in this reality many thing that are, are not, and many things that are not, are.

The task now is to examine why all this happened if we are to learn why it should not have happened. The problem cannot be attacked from just any angle whatsoever. Of necessity we must begin at the beginning, where the real and the psychic first meet, that is, with the external senses. This is the crucial point. The cognition of the external senses is "essentially experimental, and the experience is received from the objects themselves . . . It is the essence of such cognition that all our knowledge is ultimately resolved in it as having begun from it."[4] St. Thomas and his commentators, realizing that what is established here concerning the external senses and their objects either makes or breaks Realism, have taken special care to make their discussion of this point thorough and penetrating. We have already indicated the absurdity of the position that our impressions and not things are what we know. If this were so, if our impressions constituted the "what we know" then anything known would be true, and any objective standard for measuring the truth and falsity of our knowledge would be impossible. There could be no science of things but only of impressions, and every man would be his own scientific criterion.

Let us now present a more positive approach to the problem. Since it is not our intention — for it cannot be done — to prove or demonstrate anything, we can only hope to make more obvious, more explicit and more scientific, what we already know to be the case. Nor do we feel that this falls short of a true critical analysis. Gilson says that Descartes' only error was that he gave a demonstration for the validity of our

[4]John of St. Thomas, *Cursus Philosophicus* (ed. Reiser, Turin: Marietti, 1930), Phil. Nat., P. IV, q. 6, a. 2.

knowledge.[5] Where Descartes' Critica failed because he attempted a demonstration, ours succeeds with only an explanation.[6]

It is a matter of every day experience that when the eye sees, it sees some color here and now present to it; when the ear hears, it hears some sound here and now present to it; and the same is true of the other three external senses, touch, taste and smell. What is to be stressed in this statement is the phrase "here-and-now present," because, if such is not the case our external senses will not function at all. In other words, as regards their objects of knowledge the external senses are wholly receptive. They do not and cannot produce their objects. They require, and this is a pre-scientific and common conviction, the presence of the external objects which, in turn act on the peripheral organs and set them in act. There results a definite physical, chemical, and physiological process which terminates in a type of knowledge called sensation, whereby the external senses and the common sense contact the extra-mental object in its physical, here-and-now reality.

On the psychic level this union between the external senses and their objects is brought about by what Scholastics call the "impressed species."[7] Perhaps a little experiment will help us to grasp this reality.

[5]E. Gilson, *Unity of Philosophical Experience* (New York: Charles Schribner's Sons, 1937), p. 185.

[6]A demonstration is necessary only for those truths which are not immediately evident and which demand that the principles by which the conclusion is demonstrated be prior to and better known than the conclusions themselves. A demonstration which concludes to the validity of knowledge would demand principles prior to and better known than this conclusion. No such principles can be found since the essential validity of our knowledge is presupposed to all demonstrations and even to the principles themselves of the demonstration.

[7]The *impressed species* is the vicarious form of the object, by which the cognoscitive potency is actuated and determined to know an object. However, not only is there a need for the impressed species on the part of the cognoscitive potency, that the latter be actuated, but also on the part of the object, because the object in its physical reality cannot enter into the knowing faculty. Consequently, it attains this necessary union by reason of its vicariate form. The impressed species in determining the cognoscitive faculty elicites the act of knowledge and is therefore said to be a principle of knowledge. In every act of knowledge, in the external senses, in the internal senses, and in the intellect, there is alway involved an impressed species because there is always involved this twofold need, one on the part of the faculty, the other on the part of the object itself. The *expressed* species is a representation of the object, expressed or produced by and in the knowing faculty in which the object is known or contemplated. An expressed species is needed either when the object is not here-and-now physically present to the knowing faculty, or if present, is not proportioned to the faculty. An expressed species is required for all the cognoscitive faculties save the external sense and common sense because they alone attain to their object as physically, here-and-now present.

A species, be it impressed or expressed, can be considered in two ways: a) *entitatively,* as an accident, and in this case it is properly called a "form"; or b) *cognoscitively,* as relating the knowing subject to the thing which he knows, and in this case it is properly termed a "similitude." Nevertheless, even St. Thomas on occasion uses the terms "form" and "similitude" interchangeably. However, "similitude" is not synonymous with "image" or "representation," because "similitude" can be said of either an impressed or expressed species, while "image" or "representation" are reserved for application to the expressed species (although an impressed species is said to be virtually representative).

Furthermore, the words "knowledge," "impressed species," and "expressed species" are analogous. We have, for example, the sensible impressed species and the intelligible impressed species.

Call to your imagination an image, say of a roasted-brown, all-ready-to-eat Thanksgiving turkey. Now where did this image come from? The only explanations is that when this delicious fowl was actually present to your external senses, it impressed itself on your external senses and common sense, and has since been retained in your imagination.[8] So we call it an *impressed* form or species, that is, a form or species impressed on the knower by the external object. Since in every act of knowledge we know something, it is the impressed species that determines us to know "this something" rather than "another something." As John of St. Thomas remarks:

> Experience deduces (the need for the impressed species) from the internal senses, because we know things in their absence and in dreams. Therefore it is necessary that some similitude or something in the stead of these objects be in the faculties by reason of which they may know the objects themselves. For if nothing remains, and the objects themselves are not present, how could the power determine itself to know these objects rather than those . . .?[9]

Since the content of the impressed species is identical with that of the expressed species, this form of the Thanksgiving turkey recalled by the imagination functions as an impressed species inasmuch as it determines the cognoscitive faculty to know here and now this form rather than some other; it also functions as an expressed species or an image inasmuch as it was necessary to express the form of the Thanksgiving turkey due to its absence (see note 7). However, the very fact that it is necessary to advert to one of the internal senses to express or produce this form, is experimentally sufficient to prove the inability of the external senses to express their objects.[10] Consequently, if the objects of our knowledge are said to be "more or less independent of knowledge or, in other words, according as they are *less produced* and *more received* by the knowing subject," then the objects of the external senses are wholly

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[8]These forms (e.g., Thansgiving turkey) as they are stored away in those cognoscitive faculties capable of this "storage" function (and all but the external senses, common sense, and agent intellect are capable) are called impressed species in remote first act. Hence, the impressed species is said to be virtually representative because it is the vicarious form, the form of other as other. When the impressed species is recalled by the cognoscitive potency, inasmuch as it determines this potency to know this thing rather that that, it is referred to as an impressed species in proximate first act and in second act.

The impressed species here-and-now functioning can be considered either *entitatively* (and in remote first act), insofar as it is an accident here-and-now constituting a third thing, namely an actuated potency; or it can be considered *cognoscitively* (and in proximate first act and in second act) insofar as it is here-and-now determining the cognoscitive faculty to know this thing rather than that. Also, when it is not here-and-now functioning but is merely stored away in some cognoscitive faculty it is likewise said to be functioning entitatively (and in remote first act) as an accident.

The expressed species here-and-now functioning (and unlike the impressed species there is no such thing as an expressed species which does not here-and-now function) is also subject to a twofold consideration: an *entitative* consideration as an accident or quality of the cognoscitive faculty, and a *cognoscitive* consideration as a *terminus in quo* of the act of knowing, as a representation in which the thing represented is known.

[9]*Loc. cit.*

[10]Robert E. Brennan, O.P., *Thomistic Psychology* (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1941), p. 135.

trans-subjective. For what is perceived by the external senses are the external sensible qualities of things, in their concrete singularity and as physically present.[11]

We say an object is not truly trans-subjective unless it is both objectively and subjectively distinguished from knowledge. Obviously by reflection, knowledge itself can become the object of our thoughts. Yet such knowledge is not said to be trans-subjective because as an object of knowledge it is not objectively distinct from knowledge itself – it *is* knowledge. To be subjectively distinct from knowledge a thing must have real existence independently of our knowing it. The knowledge of the external senses admirably fulfills these conditions: the *subjective condition,* because, as we have pointed out, the external senses are wholly receptive of their object; the *objective condition,* because the objects of the external senses are not the external senses themselves or their sensations, for no sensitive potency can reflect upon itself, nor are the objects of the external senses the other cognoscitive potencies.[12] To hold the latter is to contradict experience, for knowledge begins in the external senses and from there passes to the other knowing faculties.

Granted that the external senses cannot reflect upon themselves and thereby know their own sensations, we must still inquire whether the impressed species, in direct cognition, is related to the faculty as its object of knowledge. In defending the common experience that the external senses (and any cognoscitive potency, for that matter) have real things for their objects, St. Thomas is insistent on the fact that the impressed species in *any* act of knowledge is the principle *by which* the cognoscitive faculty understands and in no way is it attained in that direct knowledge by which we know things. One writer, developing St. Thomas' presentation of this point, says:

> The principle that is invoked is this: every action proceeds from some form, for an agent acts according as it is actual, and it is actual by reason of form. The form in a natural agent in transient action is not *what* the natural agent does, it is not the *object* of the action, rather it is the inner determinant *whereby* the agent produces an object which is like unto itself according to form, as the hot thing by heating produces heat. Similarly, the form in the knowing agent in the immanent act of knowledge is not *what,* but the inner determinant *whereby* he know. It is like what he knows, but it is the principle of the act of knowing, not the term or the object of the act.

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[11]An object of knowledge may be *trans-subjective* in three ways: a) according to matter—that which is known, the thing known, the thought content; b) according to form—the manner in which it exists in knowledge either as concrete and individual or abstract and universal; if it is the former it is said to be trans-subjective according to form; if it is the latter it is said not to be trans-subjective according to form, because the thing known is not known in the manner in which it exists in reality; c) according to presence—as it is physically here-and-now present.

The objects of the external senses are wholly trans-subjective, i.e., according to matter, form, and presence. The objects of the internal senses are trans-subjective according to matter and form. The objects of intellectual knowledge are trans-subjective according to matter only. (Cf. Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., *Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae* [Fribourg: B. Herder Book Co., 1937], vol. II, n. 686, p. 71.)

[12]The basic reason why sense is unable to make a complete return upon itself is the material texture of its being. A faculty that is able to reflect upon itself is necessarily devoid of *all* matter; and so its object is not limited like that of the senses. (Cf. Brennen, *op. cit.,* p. 142.)

> The form in knowledge is the principle whereby the knowing agent assimilates the object, is like unto it, but it is not the object. The thing, of which the species is a similitude, is the object primarily and *per se* known.[13]

From this analysis we may conclude that the external senses, of their very nature, are ordered to know things as they are in themselves. We do not mean to say that they are incapable of error but rather that if they err it is not due to their nature but to some extrinsic factor. St. Thomas says:

> For sense is not deceived in its proper object—as sight in regards to color—save accidentally, through some hindrance occurring to the sensible organ. For example, the taste of a fever stricken person judges a sweet thing to be bitter, through his tongue being vitiated by ill humors. Sense, however, may be received as regards common sensible objects, as size or figure; when for example it judges the sun to be only a foot in diameter, whereas in reality it exceeds the earth in size. Much more is sense deceived considering accidental sensible objects as when it judges that vinegar is honey by reason of the color being the same. The reason of this is evident; for every faculty, as such, is per se directed to its proper object; and things of this kind are always the same. Hence, so long as the faculty exists, its judgment concerning its own proper object does not fail.[14]

Although, like all knowledge, this knowledge of the external senses is immanent, nevertheless it is an immanence that depends on the external object, demanding on the psychological level the vicariate form (the impressed species) of the extra-mental object in order that the cognoscitive potency may be actuated. Because nothing can give itself what it does not have, the very notion of potentiality requires an explanation in terms of something other than itself. St. Thomas asserts:

> Now we observe that man sometimes is only a potential knower, both as to sense and as to intellect. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act;—through the action of sensible objects on his senses, to the act of sensation;—by instruction or discovery, to the act of understanding. Wherefore we must say that the cognitive soul is in potentiality both to the images which are the principles of sensing, and to those which are principles of understanding.[15]

This doctrine of the impressed species and of the potentiality of the cognoscitive potencies is one which emphasizes the dependency of the knowing subject on the things which he knows and is essential to a realistic interpretation of the problem of knowledge.

Likewise the whole purpose of the physical, chemical, and physiological processes involved in our acts of knowing is not to impede but to make possible, on the psychological level, the union of the knower with the things he knows. Without these processes the cognoscitive powers could never pass from a state of potency to a state of actual knowledge.

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[13]John F. Peifer, *The Nature and Function of the Concept According to St. Thomas and John of St. Thomas* (unpublished doctorate of philosophy dissertation, St. Thomas Aquinas College, River Forest, Ill., 1951), p. 112.

[14]*Summa Theol.*, I, q. 85, a. 6. We might also point out that a demonstration of this essential infallibility of the cognitive powers is impossible. Any such demonstration would involve a *begging of the question*, that is, the fallacy of assuming as already proved that which one intends to prove.

[15]*Ibid.*, I. q. 84, a. 3.

However, as experience testifies, all these processes, both the physical and the psychical, though standing between the knower and the things he knows, do not do so as the "what we know," but rather as the "how we know."

From this discussion the *first* conclusion we wish to draw stresses the complete trans-subjectivity of the external senses, the impressed species as a principle *by which* we know, and the importance of a clear understanding of the notion of potentiality as regards these faculties. Our other conclusions will be made manifest as we further develop our subject.

We have already pointed out that the objects of the external senses, having been unified by the common sense, are presented to the other internal senses, and can be recalled by them. What we want to bring out here is the fact that the objective data of the internal senses is received from the external senses. Even as regards the cogitative power, called *vis cogitativa* in humans and *vis aestimativa* in animals, whose object is the utility or harmfulness of the external object, we are able to say that these intentions of utility and harmfulness, although they are not formally perceived by the external senses, nevertheless they are virtually contained in the impressed species of the external senses. Hence the external senses working with the common sense and the internal senses are not differentiated from one another by reason of the impressed species — the latter is numerically the same — but by the way they make use of the impressed species.[16]

Therefore, since the knowledge of the internal senses is nothing more than a further elaboration on the data of the external senses, this knowledge of the internal senses, like that of the external senses, is also trans-subjective.[17] However, introspection tells us that the functioning of the internal senses (save for the common sense) does not depend on the here-and-now physical appearance of the object known.[18] Thus the trans-subjectivity of the internal senses is not a trans-subjectivity of presence, but of matter and form only (see note 10).

When dealing with objects here-and-now not physically present as in the case of the internal senses, the objections of the subjectivists about

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[16]Cf. John of St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Phil. Nat., P. IV, q. 8, a. 2.

[17]Gredt, *op. cit.*, vol. II, n. 687, p. 74.

[18]Nevertheless, in the case of man, even in the presence of an object, the internal senses can and do function, and this is necessary if man is to have an intellectual knowledge of the object here-and-now present to his external senses. For this present external object, acting on the external senses and common sense, is not as such proportioned to the agent intellect. The imagination (by enriching the phantasm with previously apprehended data not under the aspect of "previous" for this pertains to sense memory, which can also function in the presence of an object, although it does not necessarily do so) and the cogitative power (by providing the *experimentum* or experience which results from the colation of many singular impressions which have been received by the sense memory) render the here-and-now physically present object proportionate to the activity of the agent intellect. Thus, the scholastics demand an expressed species (such as our sensible images, memories, and estimations) for the agent intellect to act upon.

Just as the word phantasy is generic and refers to the three internal senses of the imagination, memory, and cognitative powers, so also the word "phantasm" (or sensible expressed species) is generic and refers to the products of any one of these three internal senses.

knowing our own subjective modifications are more apparent. For in external sensation we are so taken up by the object and its physical here-and-now reality that we scarcely can doubt that we grab hold of the thing as it is in itself. But in our internal sense knowledge when we are dealing with things not here-and-now present it seems reasonable to object that our images might indeed stand between us and the things we want to know. If President Eisenhower, for example, is not here-and-now present to our external senses and, in order to contemplate him an image must be produced, does it not seem logical to say it is the image of President Eisenhower we contemplate rather than "Ike" himself? Again Realism must stand the test. The whole Thomistic doctrine of intellectual knowledge, and of all science, depends upon a solid defense of Realism, not only in the external senses, but in the internal senses as well.

In order to answer this difficulty we shall perform a very simple experiment. Let us form in our imagination an image of President Eisenhower. When we first look, as it were, at this image, we see the President himself, his familiar wave of the hand, friendly smile, and so forth. What we wish to emphasize here is that what we know immediately is President Eisenhower, numerically the same President Eisenhower who, today, at this very moment, occupies the position of supreme authority in our land. The note of "representation" of our "image" is in no way realized in this immediate act of knowing. However, upon reflection we perceive not President Eisenhower, the individual with extra-mental existence, but our image of him, President Eisenhower with intentional existence, as he has become numerically identified with the knowing subject as an image in our imagination. So we see that materially the same form, the President, which has been expressed in our imaginations, is attained in our direct knowledge as that extra-mental reality which is "Ike" himself, but upon reflection is attained as a form existing in our imagination, as an expressed species, as an image.[19]

[19]An expressed species by its very definition implies two things: a *that which* is expressed and the *fact* that it is expressed by and in the cognoscitive faculty, that is, it has psychic or intentional *esse* owing to its existence in the cognoscitive potency. However, it is only by reflection that we attain to the expressed species because it is only by reflection that we know both of these facts. Directly and immediately we apprehend only the *that* which is expressed, and as such this form (i.e., the that which is expressed) is numerically identified with the thing outside, if it be a sensible expressed species, and specifically identified with the thing outside if it be an intelligible expressed species. When upon reflection we attain to the expressed species and we know the form with intentional existence, we perceive it (i.e., either the sensible or intelligible expressed species) as numerically identified with the knowing subject.

Only when the form is considered with its intentional existence—and this achieved by reflection—is it properly referred to as an image or an expressed species. The form alone which is apprehended immediately and directly is not known as a representation of the thing but is attained as the very thing itself. It is not a matter of first knowing a representation and this in turn leading us to a knowledge of the thing. That is why we say the expressed species is a formal sign and not an instrumental sign. For whereas the instrumental sign must first be known and a second act of knowledge is needed to attain that which is signified by the instrumental sign, the form of the expressed species and the thing are attained in one and the same act because they are identified. Yet this identification whereby the knower becomes

Our *second conclusion* stresses the trans-subjectivity of the internal senses as regards matter and form, and the form of the expressed species as that which is attained primarily, and the expressed species itself as that which is attained secondarily and by reflection. Consequently, what was primarily attained by the subjectivist, his own sensations and images, is secondarily and by reflection attained by us. In his process of analysis the subjectivist reflected, and in a sense failing to take cognizance of this fact, namely, that he was reflecting, ends up by making those things attained in his reflexive act (his own sensations and images) not only the object of his reflexive knowledge, but the object of all his knowledge. He has forgotten that he was seeking *what* he knows and not *how* he knows. "Things" which constitute the "what we know" are attained primarily and immediately, while our sensations and images, which constitute the "how we know," are attained secondarily and by reflection. To confuse these two is to confuse the psychological order, the order of how we know, with the critical order, the order of what we know.

Such a mix-up may offer a difficulty to the epistomologist and demand his attention, but it cannot be said to be a true epistomological problem. A realistic epistomology is founded upon the assumption that things both exist and are known, and presupposes a clear understanding of the distinction between the psychological and the critical order. The positive approach to the epistomological problem while it attempts no demonstration, realizing that there is nothing prior to or better known than the fact of our knowing things in themselves, nevertheless is more truly critical when it attempts to explain in what the truth of our knowledge consists, where this truth is to be found, its causes, and so forth.

Since in this problem of knowledge, as in all problems, we proceed from what is more known to what is less known, the better grasp we have of sense knowledge, the better ought to be our understanding of intellectual knowledge. In fact, much of what we have already said of knowledge on the sense level can analogously be said of knowledge on the intellectual level. We have already indicated that the definitions of the leading terms used in this discussion are analogous, and hence are meant to apply in all cases, in a manner basically different, but somewhat alike.

Subjectivism in its intellectual aspect, commonly called Idealism, asserts that what is known in intellectual knowledge is not extra-mental being, but intellectual knowledge itself. Our own ideas and concepts are the objects of our own thoughts. Descartes is generally acclaimed – at least in modern philosophy – as the Father of Idealism.

Although philosophers subsequent to Descartes offered a variety of philosophical systems, if they acknowledged the existence of intellectual

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the thing known is not an identification *simpliciter* but only *secundum quid*. For example, in knowing President Eisenhower in the sensible order, we are identified with him, we become him intentionally (*secundum quid*) but not physically (*simpliciter*). In brief, let us note that the form in knowledge and the form of the thing itself as regards *form* are not distinguishable, but as regards *esse* they are.

knowledge at all, they were quite sure, thanks to Descartes, that ideas constitute the "what" we know. This notion went for the most part unchallenged. Someone has made the statement that "Bishop Berkeley says that there is no such thing as matter, and it doesn't matter what Bishop Berkeley says." This may be true enough, but we would like to quote one passage from the good Bishop which, despite its naivete, is expressive of the extent to which the Idealistic doctrine can be pushed:

> It is indeed an opinion strangely prevailing amongst men, that houses, mountains, rivers, and in a word all sensible objects have an existence, natural or real, distinct from their being perceived by the understanding. But with how great an assurance and acquiescence soever this principle may be entertained in the world, yet whoever shall find in his heart to call it into question may, if I mistake not, perceive it to involve a manifest contradiction. For what are the forementioned objects but the things we perceive by sense: And what do we perceive besides our own ideas or sensations? And is it not plainly repugnant that any of these, or any combination of them, should exist unperceived?[20]

Before taking up the errors of the Idealists, it might be of value to examine briefly the existence of intellectual knowledge, especially, since among the moderns and ancients, this fact has been called into question.

An intellectual expressed species (formal concept or idea) is a representation expressed by the mind and in the mind, representing a nature abstractly conceived as belonging in many, as identified with them and multiplied in them.[21] That we truly possess such ideas is evident from internal experience and from the testimony of consciousness. Reflection reveals to us that we grasp reality in two ways: first, according to its individual material conditions, (for example, *this* arm), and this is proper to the senses; secondly, in a universal abstract manner, leaving the individual material conditions behind, and this is proper to the intellect. The word "arm" stands for the perfection of "armness" which has been apprehended by the knowing subject, and because the individual material conditions have been left behind, this perfection of "armness" can be applied to all arms. What was a concrete individuated arm has now become a universal, and is applicable to the inferiors from which it originated. In other words, when a dog looks at the arm of Peter and then at the arm of Paul, it receives two distinct images, one of Peter's arm, the other of Paul's. When man looks at these realities, besides receiving two distinct images, he perceives the relationship of "armness" between the arm of Peter and that of Paul, and expresses this relationship by the word "arm." This relationship is necessarily devoid of all the individuating notes, of any "this-ness," for if it were not, it could not be said of two individually distinct realities.

We previously stated that what was lacking in the subjectivist doctrine of knowledge were the notions of the impressed species and of the potentiality of the cognoscitive potencies. This is no less true on the intellectual level than on the sensitive level. The intellect is a potency

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[20]George Berkeley, *Principles of Human Knowledge* (New York: The Modern Library, 1932), p. 524.

and in no way can it be said to be productive of its own thought content. It cannot give itself the objects of its knowledge; it can only receive them. In the words of St. Thomas:

> Now we observe that man is at times only a potential knower both with regard to sense knowledge and with regard to intellectual knowledge. And he is reduced from such potentiality to act, indeed to the act of sensation, through the action of sensible objects on the sense, and to the act of understanding through instruction or discovery. Therefore, we must say that the cognitive soul is in potency to the similitudes which are the principles of sensing, and to the similitudes which are the principles of understanding.[21]

In order to account for these similitudes, these impressed intelligible species which are impressed upon the possible intellect, the doctrine of the agent intellect and abstraction must come into play. The impressed intelligible species is produced by the agent intellect in cooperation with the sensible phantasm. The phantasm alone does not suffice to produce the impressed intelligible species since it is a corporeal organ and represents the individuating material conditions of the object. It is said to be only potentially intelligible. Neither is the agent intellect alone sufficient to produce the intelligible impressed species, since the latter is something indetermined, capable of working on any phantasm. However, because the agent intellect is a spiritual faculty it is said to be the principle cause of the spiritual impressed species, while the phantasm acts as an instrumental cause. Likewise, if the phantasm was potentially intelligible, then the impressed intelligible species is actually so (the intelligible in act). Note carefully the word 'intelligible," that is, capable of being understood. Actual understanding occurs only after the impressed intelligible species has been presented to the possible intellect, thereupon reducing this intellect from a state of potency to act. This act (called *dictio*) produces a concept in which the act of understanding (called *intellectio*) terminates in the contemplation of the thing.

The psychology of Descartes, although admitting the reality of intellectual knowledge, advocated a complete separation between the activities of the senses and that of the intellect, missing entirely the fact of the intellect's being a potentiality. Whereas such a psychology had no other choice than to make the intellect productive of its own thought content, Thomistic psychology firmly substantiates the dependence of the intellect on the senses for the objects of its knowledge, and these in turn are extra-mental realities. It is by this process of the agent intellect's abstraction that the objective data of the senses are presented to the intellect, being received according to the mode of the receiver, that is, in a universal and abstract manner.

Consequently, the trans-subjectivity of intellectual knowledge will be a trans-subjectivity of matter only. There can be no trans-subjectivity of form because the intellect knows things not in the singular, concrete manner in which they are found in the extra-mental world, but in a universal manner of which the intellect, by the aforementioned process, is

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[21] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 84, a. 3.

productive. There can be no trans-subjectivity of presence because intellectual knowledge abstracts from the individuating note of the here-and-now presence of an object. The intellect knows "stone," "man," "horse," and only by recourse to the external senses can the knowing subject realize whether or not these realities are here and now physically present in individuals.

In the first part of our study we pointed out why the sensible impressed species was not related to the knowing powers as *that which* is known, but as that *by which* some reality is known. The same holds for the intelligible impressed species and for the same reasons, namely, the absurdity of holding this position and from the very nature of the impressed species itself. These are the reasons given by St. Thomas. In regard to the first he says:

> The species received in the possible intellect is not that which is understood, for since all of the arts and sciences are concerned with things that we understand, it would follow that all the sciences would be only a species existing in the possible intellect, which is evidently false. Nevertheless, everything that is known in all of the sciences is known through them (the species).[22]

The second point, namely, that the very nature of the impressed species is to serve as a principle of knowledge, has been adequately discussed in the first part of our paper. We have also mentioned that St. Thomas treats explicitly this problem in the first part of the Summa. The following is a passage taken from this question:

> Hence that by which sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence, and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is understood primarily is the object of which the species is the likeness.[23]

In our third conclusion we stressed the trans-subjectivity of intellectual knowledge, a trans-subjectivity of matter only, and we point out again that just as in the sensible order, so too in the intellectual order, the impressed species is that *by which* the knowing subject understands.

That something be known it must in some way be present to the knowing subject. If it is not present, if a knowing faculty is to contemplate an object, it must produce or express this object. The intellect is no exception. The intelligible expressed species (idea, formal concept, mental word) is required because the intellect is independent of the physical presence of its object. There is another reason why the intellect has need of an expressed species, and this is because of the way in which it receives the objects of its knowledge, that is, abstracted from the individuating, material conditions. We do not mean to say that the intellect does not know that which exists in the concrete singular; but

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[22]*Summa Contra Gentiles* (ed. Leonina Manualis, Rome: Desclée & C.–Herder, 1934), Bk. II, 75.

[23]*Summa Theol.*, I. q. 85, a. 2.

rather in knowing that which exists in the concrete singular it does not know it *as* existing in the concrete singular. In order that the object of the intellect be made proportionate to the intellect itself, it must be stripped of all its material principles and be made immaterial or spiritual. Indeed, both the intelligible impressed and expressed species are immaterial and spiritual, but whereas the former functions as a principle of knowledge, the latter functions as a term of knowledge.

For Thomists, the intelligible species or formal concept is a representation in which the knowing subject contemplates the thing. It is defined as that which is expressed in the knowing faculty and by the knowing faculty in which the thing is known. In a formal concept, then, we can distinguish at least two things: the *that which is expressed* (man) and the fact that it is expressed *by and in the intellect,* that is, the that which is expressed (man) has intentional or psychic existence precisely because it is expressed in and by the intellect. However, as experience clearly manifests, in direct knowledge we merely know *that which is expressed* — and we call this the objective concept. In reflex knowledge we attain to the *that which is expressed* with its psychic *esse* — we know the formal concept, or our own ideas. Of course, even in direct knowledge, we have formal concepts, but they are not said to be the objects of our knowledge; rather they are performing their psychological or formal function as expressed species, because only in so far as the form of "man" is expressed by and in our intellect, can we ever know it. The whole purpose of the formal concept is to represent to the mind extramental reality and not to make itself known. Experience shows that we are in no way conscious of first knowing a representation, and then having examined this, of passing on to a knowledge of that of which it is a representation.

In knowing things represented in our formal concepts we know them exactly as they are represented to us, as abstract and universal. This does not mean that we do not know forms which exist in reality, but the point is we do not know them *as* they exist in reality. Concerning this point, St. Thomas had this to say:

> When it is said that something is actually understood two things are implied, namely, the thing which is understood, and the fact that is understood. Similarly, when it is said that something is an abstract universal two things are conveyed to the mind, namely, the nature itself of a thing, and its abstraction or universality. Indeed the nature itself which suffers the act of being understood, or the act of being abstracted, or the intention of universality, exists only in individuals; it exists as understood or abstracted, or with the intention of universality but only in the intellect.[24]

So we may say that our objective concepts, the things known, are these abstracted universal natures, stripped of all their individual material conditions. Still that which is known by the intellect is the extra-mental reality, because although the extra-mental reality is a singular and concrete thing it does not have to be considered as singular and concrete.

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[24] *Ibid.,* ad 2.

We said that an Idealist is one who claims to know ideas rather than things. One of the facts that seems especially to support this point of view is the enormous difference between things as they exist in the intellect and in reality. The things outside are all individual material things actually existing, while our ideas are universal spiritual realities which abstract from actual existence (but not from *order* to actual existence). Thomistic psychology, making ample use of the hylomorphic theory, and the real distinction between essence and existence, reconciles these differences. Because in reality there is a real distinction between the individuating and the formal principles of things, the mind can consider the latter abstracted from the former without fear of invalidating its knowledge. In other words, the mind can consider "man" independent of any individuating principles and still have a firm grip on reality, because in truth the formal principles (man) are really distinct, though not separated, from the individuating principles. Also, because actual existence is really distinct from both the essence and its formal part, the mind can consider the form abstracted from actual existence. Cartesian psychology, on the other hand, ignorant of the hylomorphic theory and of the real distinction between essence and existence can not do so.

Our final conclusion, then, is one that especially stresses that the expressed species, the formal concept, is that in which we contemplate the thing, the objective concept. It is the latter that is directly and immediately known while the former is only known by reflection. Furthermore, the Thomistic theory of hylomorphism and the real distinction between essence and existence is capable of explaining the apparent incompatibility of man's intellectual knowledge with the material realities in the world around him.

Etienne Gilson, in the closing pages of *The Unity of Philosophical Experience,* has this to say concerning the philosophy of Idealism. Let these words of his be our conclusion.

> The most tempting of all the false first principles is: that *thought,* not *being,* is involved in all my representations. Here lies the initial option between idealism and realism, which will settle once and for all the future course of our philosophy, and make it a failure or a success. Are we to encompass being with thought, or thought with being? In other words, are we to include the whole in one of its parts, or one of the parts in its whole? If intellectual evidence is not enough to dictate our choice, history is there to remind us that no one ever regains the whole of reality after locking himself up with one of its parts. Man is not a mind that thinks, but a being who knows other beings as true, who loves them as good, and who enjoys them as beautiful. For all that which is, down to the humblest forms of existence, exhibits the inseparable privileges of being, which are truth, goodness, and beauty.[25]

Thomas Aquinas Morrison, O.P.

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[25]Gilson, *op. cit.,* p. 299.

THE INTENSITY OF CHARITY

ST. JOHN TELLS US, "If anyone says, 'I love God,' and hates his brother, he is a liar. For how can he who does not love his brother, whom he sees, love God, whom he does not see?"[1] St. Thomas goes on from here and objects[2] that a thing is more lovable insofar as it is more visible; hence, God, who is less visible than our neighbor, is less to be loved out of charity than neighbor. A moment's reflection will show us the reasonableness of this objection. A mother, as she cradles her newborn baby in her arms, can think of no object in the whole world that is quite so lovable; a newlywed couple, as they leave on their honeymoon, can rightly feel that words are woefully inadequate to express the depth of their love, and that never has the love of God attracted them so powerfully as has this married love of bride and bridegroom for each other.

However, St. Thomas is quick to point out that God should be loved more than neighbor: "If anyone comes to me and does not hate his father and mother, and wife and children, and brothers and sisters, yes, and even his own life, he cannot be my disciple."[3] This is true because friendship is based on the communication of some good, and charity, which is friendship with God, is based on the communication to us of God's beatitude. This beatitude consists essentially in God as in the first principle, and from Him flows out into other creatures — men and angels — who have the capacity for that beatitude. Therefore, "God should principally and to the greatest extent (*maxime*) be loved as the cause of beatitude, and our neighbor as one participating in beatitude."[4]

In reply to the difficulty, namely, that vision is the cause of love, St. Thomas admits a double cause of love. The first cause is the *good itself*, for that is the basic reason (*ratio*) for our love; the second cause is *vision* insofar as it is a way toward the acquiring of love — our love begins with visible things and mounts upward toward invisible things.

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[1] I John 4:20.
[2] *Summa Theologiae*, II-II, q. 26, a. 2, obj. 1.
[3] Luke 14:26.
[4] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 26, a. 2.

And since goodness, not visibility, is the basic reason for love, God is more lovable than neighbor because He has greater goodness in Himself; He *is* all-good.[5]

To explain this reply more fully, the commentators commonly interject a distinction here, and say that while it is true that God can be loved more than neighbor "objectively" and "appreciatively," yet a neighbor can be loved "intensively" more than God.

First, let us define our terms: *objectively,* we love that person more to whom we wish a greater good; *appreciatively,* we love more him whom we prefer simply, and whom we hold in higher estimation than another; *intensively* we love that person more whom we hold in greater and more fervent affection. As an example of the distinction between the latter two, a father may love both of his sons; yet he loves the younger more intensively and fervently, while he loves the older more appreciatively because he is the older and will inherit the property.[6]

It is evident that there is a very good basis for this distinction. A quick reflection on one's own experience shows how easy it is to love men whom we can see and how difficult to love God whom we cannot see. Men are present to us, close to us, and attract us mightily by their good qualities. God, considered in His divinity, is a remote and rather terrifying person, even to some of those who are considered as good Catholics. Besides, this love for fellow-men is such a strong attraction that it could easily be a source of scruple for a good Catholic. Conceivably he could say to himself: "We are supposed to love God above all things, but here I am loving all these people more than God because I feel a much stronger attraction toward them than I do toward God." This would be particularly true between a man and wife who are truly in love, where there is a tremendous human attraction drawing them together.

However, we must distinguish our use of the word "love." It can refer either to *divine* love, charity, which is based on the communication of a divine beatitude; or it can refer to *human* love, which is based on the communication of a perfection or excellence proper to man.

From this it is easy to see that the basic reason for the divine love of charity is the divine goodness, as it is communicated to us in the divine beatitude; the basic reason for human love is a human goodness which, because it is visible, attracts us. Yet this human goodness, as goodness, is far inferior to the divine goodness which is the basic motive of charity.

We state firmly that God cannot be loved less than our neighbor, *even intensively,* provided that we consider love in this case as being charity.

St. Thomas seems to infer this, when he mentions that God is loved as the *cause* of beatitude, while one's neighbor is loved as one *participat-*

[5]*Loc. cit.*, obj. 1.
[6]B. Merkelbach, O.P., *Summa Theol. Moralis* (Paris: Desclée, 1947), vol. I, p. 693.

ing in beatitude together with us; and hence God is loved *maxime.* Man is made in *God's* image, not in man's image; it is God's image in men that make men similar to each other. In order truly to love the image, it must be seen as an image which reflects the infinite lovableness of its maker, an image which is caused by that maker. Adam, and every other man, was created in the image of *God,* so that both in nature and time his similitude to God precedes his similitude to other men.

A greater similarity, other things being equal, is the reason for a greater love. In this case, other things not being equal, the similarity to God is prior to and the cause of the similarity to neighbor. True, men resemble each other insofar as they are rational beings, but it is more correct to say that they resemble each other because they first resemble God. Man's similitude to God has a causal, and therefore a greater, priority over his similitude to other men, and hence because he is first made in *God's* image a man is held to love God more than neighbor. In this manner Cajetan[7] implements the teaching of his master. While he does not make the distinction between appreciative and intensive, he surely intends to consider man's love for God as being greater than his love (or charity) for neighbor under both these aspects. The very fact that he did not make the distinction seems to indicate that he had no question about it.

Billuart, quoted by Fr. Merkelbach,[8] notes the interesting fact that under the same word of *intensity* St. Thomas spoke of both intensity and appreciation, both being from the part of the agent. This, again, might explain Cajetan's silence concerning what he would consider a useless distinction.

From the very nature of charity itself it seems clear that neighbor cannot be loved more intensively than God – opposing *intensive* to *appreciative* and *objective.* For we love our neighbor in charity precisely for what there is of God in him, that is, for his ability to participate in beatitude. To say, then, that we can love God in our neighbor more intensively and with greater fervor of will than we love God in Himself, is to say that we love the participation more than the total reality. The intensity of our affection in such a case is caused by the weight of the affection of the will itself, drawing it toward the loved object. An object that is seen as more lovable by the lover will be loved more intensely. If one's neighbor is seen under the aspect of lovable for what there is of God in him, or as lovable because of his ability to participate in the beatitude of God, then that very divine beatitude must be loved more than the neighbor himself. Why? Because we love neighbor *into* that divine beatitude; we either wish him to actualize that potency of his to communicate in the divine beatitude (as he can do in this life by means of sanctifying grace), or else to grow in that participation until he reaches

[7]Cajetan, *In Summa Theol.* (ed. Leonina, vol. VIII, *Opera Omnia,* Rome: Typ. Poly. Vat., 1895), II-II, q. 26, a. 2.
[8]*Loc cit.,* footnote 1.

its consummation in heaven. The intensity of our love for neighbor, then, will be proportioned to the intensity of our love for God Himself, the final beatitude *into* whom we desire our neighbor to grow.

Again, many of the saints have stated that our love for neighbor is the criterion of our love for God. To paraphrase St. Catherine of Siena, our Lord said to her in her Dialogue: "I have put your neighbor in the world that you may love him of free grace, and what you do to him I count as done to me." Our love of God is manifested *through* our neighbor. The end is willed before the means, and the means is loved more intensely (as well as more appreciatively) insofar as it leads us to the end we seek. When we love our neighbor for what there is of God in him, it is because we do love God first, and then we love our neighbor not for himself alone but with the desire that he participate more and more in the divine good of God.

In what sense, then, is neighbor loved more intensively than God Himself? Keeping in mind the distinction between human and divine love, we can say that we can have a more intense *human* love for some other person than we have an intense *divine* love (or charity) for God. But we cannot have a more intense *charity* for some other person than we have for God.

Fr. Merkelbach[9] explains this distinction when he says that intensive love is caused by sensible, present goods, because those things which are close move us more than those things which are far away and above us. Hence, he implies that our act of charity toward our neighbor is more intense than our act of charity toward God, not by reason of that very charity itself but by reason of certain sensible goods or excellencies possessed by our neighbor.

He further states that the creature cannot be loved more intensely than God if it is loved out of charity in that very same act in which God is loved, because thus the reason of loving the creature is God beloved, who forsooth is more greatly loved.

In summary, we see that the creature can be loved more intensely than the creator, with greater fervor of will, as is evident in the case of man and wife. However, one's neighbor is not loved more intensely by reason of charity itself – for the motive of charity is the divine good– but he is loved more intensely by reason of his proper good, because he is sensible, present, and more proportioned to us.

The divine love of charity is caused in us by what is of God in our neighbor, while his proper, human perfections can only cause human love in us. Hence, while the proper good of our neighbor can *dispose* us to have greater charity toward him, it cannot actually intensify our charity, toward him to the extent that it is more intense than our charity toward God. However, our charity, working in the other direction can

[9] *Loc cit.*, footnote 3.

command this human love for neighbor so that it is totally directed into willing for him this divine beatitude.

The reason for the intensity of our charity is this. The intensity of any act flows ultimately from its object – its closeness to us, its lovableness seen by us and weighing our will in its favor. Hence, the intenseness of our charity toward neighbor will be moved by the divine good seen in our neighbor – the communication of beatitude – and we can only have a more fervent act of charity toward neighbor by wishing more intensely and fervently that he communicate in beatitude more perfectly. But this presupposes that we love the beatitude itself more appreciatively and even more fervently – for our desire to see another attain an end is proportioned to our own desire for the end itself. Our love for God Himself, as possessing perfect beatitude in Himself, must be proportionately more fervent before we can make a more fervent act of willing that someone else attain that end by participating in that beatitude.

In conclusion, a very brief consideration of this point from another angle might bring it out more clearly. St. Thomas asks[10] whether it is more meritorious to love God than neighbor. The answer, as usual, is under a distinction. If we consider love of God and love of neighbor separately, it is more meritorious to love God for here the reward of our love will be the enjoyment of God Himself. Our Lord has promised us, "If anyone love me, he will be loved by my Father . . ., and I will manifest myself to him."[11]

However, if we love our neighbor because of God, then the love of neighbor will *include* the love of God. Hence, this love of neighbor which includes love of God will be a perfect love compared to that love of God which, when it excludes our neighbor, is imperfect and insufficient. "We have this commandment from the Lord, that he who loves God loves his brother also."[12] Perfect love of God includes love of neighbor for God's sake.

A good example of this is found in those mysterious words of St. Paul, "For I could wish to be anathema myself from Christ for the sake of my brethren, who are my kinsmen according to the flesh."[13] St. Thomas (although he gives other interpretations also) quotes[14] St. John Chrysostom when he says that these words may be understood as showing forth not a greater love for neighbor than for God, but a greater love for God than for himself. St. Paul was willing to be deprived of the enjoyment of God *for a time* – which enjoyment pertains to love of self and desire for one's own perfection – to the end that God's honor might be increased in his fellow Jews – which end pertains to love of God. How-

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[10]*Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 27, a. 8.
[11]John 14:21.
[12]I John 4:21.
[13]Romans 9:3.
[14]*Loc cit.*, ad 1.

ever we explain it, love of God and love of neighbor go hand in hand; perfect love of God demands love of neighbor.

Hence, the intensity of our charity for neighbor will depend upon the intensity of our charity for God, and we love our neighbor out of charity for what there is of God in him. Our Lord's advice to the apostles at the Last Supper bears this out: "As the Father has loved me, I also have loved you. Abide in my love . . . This is my commandment, that you love one another as I have loved you."[15]

Austin Green, O.P.

[15]John 15: 9 & 12.

EAST SIDE OF EDEN

AND CAIN WENT out from the face of the Lord, and dwelt as a fugitive on the earth, at the east side of Eden.[1]

There is a dramatic and tragic story being lived in the world today — the story of a people, a cursed race that nineteen hundred years ago was dispersed over the face of the earth in twos and threes, and for centuries has wandered, unwanted, desired by no one, and insofar as they have held on to their culture and their beliefs, acceptable nowhere. These are the Jews: the Cain of Scripture, murderer of his brother, Abel; Cain — pursued by a curse for killing the good shepherd whose sacrifice alone was pleasing to God; punished, not by death, but by a condemnation to walk the earth apart from other men, yet marked out and protected by God in a special way and for his own mysterious purposes.

Why have they been persecuted? They ask this question themselves. The greatest punishments meted out by God to the Jews had been the forty years in the desert, or the seventy years of the Babylonian Captivity — for killing prophets or adoring false gods. Why would nineteen centuries of the Dispersal have been sent upon them? Was it for rejecting Jesus after all? And if so, then what is to be the end of it all? What is to come of the Jew?

The Jew — we speak of him as though he were a creature of a single species. Yet Jews of today are divided as they have never been divided before. Judaism has obtained citizenship in all lands, sought membership in all races, on all social and educational levels — sometimes poles apart on matters of economy, politics, or social justice. Doctrinally, they are in chaos, even on the most basic religious tenets. Yet Jews are somehow one; and to the extent that they remain Jews, universally persecuted.

What is the Jew? Is he a Zionist? Member of a race or religion? A Bolshevik? This is not a trite or facetious problem. One particular answer to this question was the cause of death to five-and-a-half million Jews in the last war.

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[1]Gen. 4:16.

What are Jews? They are not a race certainly. "Semite," "Hebrew"—these are not racial names; they do not refer to any set of determined physical characteristics, but rather denote linguistic families. Science and history assert very definitely that physically there is no real Jewish type, and the "common Sense" "man-on-the-street" certitude to the contrary is based on propaganda-stimulated prejudice and a kind of hand-me-down superstition. Almost from the beginning of Jewish history, Judaism has been plagued by racial infiltration and intermarriage, so that any theory of pure-blooded semitism is out of the question. For example, the Jew today in modern Israel is indistinguishable from the Moslem Arab as regard racial characteristics. In the same way Jews of any particular national ancestry have the same physical features as Gentiles of the same inheritance, although certainly Judaism may appear more often among certain peoples.

Nor are Jews a nation. Historically, Israel's political independence ended with Pompey's storm of Jerusalem in 63 B.C.; the Jerusalem of the Temple and the sacrifice was destroyed in 70 A.D. Although there have been many attempts to re-build the Temple and re-occupy the Holy City, only in our own times has the state of Israel actually been restored, and so independent of the religious faith of the past or present as to be totally unrepresentative of Jews today.

As a matter of fact, Zionism for centuries was condemned by Orthodox Jewry as the hastening of the times of the Messiah – for there will be no Temple, no reinstitution of the sacrifice, no expectation of the Messiah. In our day this opposition has largely disappeared because clearly a state in Israel is the only safeguard from persecution in a world where Jewish life is so expendable. Consequently for the benefit of the Jewish refugee and the homeless, thousands of Jews all over the world stand behind a homeland of Israel, although they may have no intention of ever going there.

The obvious classification of the Jew is a religious one, providing we allow a good deal of latitude to our concept of "religious classification." Jewry today is divided into three camps: Orthodox, Conservative, and Reformed. Orthodoxy is the ancient Judaism of the Mosaic Law attempting to live today according to the circumstances of modern life. Orthodox Jews conceive their religion in terms of ceremonial, the Aaronic priesthood, the prophets, a personal Messiah, and the Fatherhood of God. Those that live their religious life to the fullest bind themselves to the fasts, diets, and ritual impurities laid down in the Old Testament.

Reform Judaism is a reaction of the nineteenth century against the restrictions of Orthodoxy. They hold to the evolution of religious truth and protest against the legalism of a strict interpretation of the Torah of the Law. Reform rabbis are the most vocal and best-known representatives of Judaism in America today.

Conservative Judaism is a compromise between Orthodoxy and Reform Judaism. It retains the Hebrew language and ancient ceremonial

in the liturgy to a greater extent than the Reformed branch. Conservatism promotes Jewish settlement in Palestine more than the other two groups, but in doctrine generally tends to follow Reformed Jewish leaders. It is almost wholly an American product.

Orthodoxy is by far the most powerful of the three numerically, but statistics show that in this country at least it is on the decline. Orthodoxy is the Judaism with which we can make historical contact because, grasping stubbornly at the past, it has remained closest to the roots of the Jewish faith.

And it is not difficult to see why this brand of Jewish religion is losing ground. Obviously the strict fasts, dietary laws, observance of feasts, rules on dress, long prayers – all these practices are almost impossible except in a closed Jewish community. Furthermore, this kind of Jewish life is deeply woven into the fabric of family life, which is seeing its dissolution today. Jewish youth clearly senses this hostility of the modern world to their faith. A choice must be made, and youth's desire for conformism seems to spell death to Orthodox Judaism. There are no longer definite formulas of faith or doctrine; modern ideologies have been totally ignored, left without refutation. What hapepns when young Jews are exposed to modern thought and are defenseless against it? Aren't they likely to reject their own religion as outworn and arid? Such seems indeed to be the case.

And of course this definition of the Jew seems to exclude those who have defected to Christian or other faiths; and the religious indifferentists who comprise two-thirds of that group we of today call "Jews." Do these last somehow fall short of any definition of the Jew, as a Catholic apostate would be excluded from any consideration of Catholicism? Orthodox Jews might say yes. But liberals of today say once a Jew, always a Jew, and include all who are "of Jewish culture." They point to Karl Marx, who vehemently hated the very people from which he had sprung, and to Heine and to Spinoza. Certainly, as in the case of Edith Stein, the pogrom in Germany against the Jews did not stop with synagogue pewholders.

How then can we know just what the Jews is? To us, as Catholics, the Jews are witnesses to truth in a way far above their profoundest conception. Their purpose was to prepare the way for the Messiah; they are waiting for something that has already happened. He has come and gone without them. Now, in their exile, they fulfill Christ's prophecies as well as their own that they would be flung out over the world – scattered.

In their own eyes, however, Jews are little more than a combination of a certain inheritance from those who worshipped God according to the Jewish religion, a certain culture in which the entire life of individual and family centered around religion, and even – though many would deny this – a monotheistic faith in a personal God who providentially cares for man and to whom man can relate himself, a faith and a doctrine that

they have brought down through the ages with them. Yes, they are anchored to the past, the most liberal of them, and their tradition is inescapable. We must then define the Jew in terms of the Mosaic Law and Mosaic religion, because it is from this standard that even the fallen-away Jew takes his name "Jew" and bears his part in witnessing to the judgments of God. The past is with him, and try as he might, the modern Jew cannot shake it off. If he has lost for himself God, the Messiah, revelation, perhaps he tries also to lose himself and his Judaism — either in radicalism, in which social, religious, racial, and national distinctions disappear; or in a violent assertion of his Jewishness in some great movement such as Zionism.

But the mark is there — the mark that joins him to all Jews everywhere, not merely of religion, but of a complex heritage: God's mark on Cain of non-acceptance and persecution in all ages.

What do Jews find hardest about Catholicism to understand? What are the blocks, the obstacles, that must be overcome in our dealings with them, the doctrine that must be most carefully explained?

Some Jews have read the Gospels of our Faith and studied the teachings of Jesus. To many he is a great ethical thinker, and has been assimilated into Jewish thought as another, and perhaps the greatest, Jewish prophet. He is theirs. They admire His teachings, although — a common point made — it is obvious that these teachings are too sublime for men to live, of so high an order that if ever men did live them, the world must be changed.

Then they point to the middle ages, our ages of faith. You see, the race memory recalls the Inquisition, persecution, imprisonment in ghettoes, when they were, for all practical purposes stigmatized as foreigners in the land of their birth, their property liable to seizure at any time. We explain these things of course in the light of the times as excesses and violations of Christianity, but the modern Jew oftentimes still identifies Catholics and the Church with his persecutors of the past.

There is a very old story, told from far back in Jewish history. It is not a humorous story, but rather one for our own self-reproach. A rabbi visiting Jerusalem was surprised suddenly to hear the mighty blowing of trumpets and the sound of a great crowd. When he asked the reason, he was told of a rumor then circulating through the city that at last the Messiah had come. He walked over to the window and looked out and around. He looked to the right and to the left — at the crowds down below and out over Jerusalem at the far hills. He shook his head and said only: "I see no change."

If the Messiah came nineteen hundred years ago, is the accusation, why the slaughter of today? Where is the world of peace, lion lying with the lamb? And no answer forthcoming, the Orthodox continues to seek peace in his synagogue, and the Zionist the simple security of collective farms in the Holy Land.

And let's admit from the outset that the non-believers have phrased the paradox very well. There is, after all, no way of telling how many have been dissuaded from inquiring further into the Christian ideal simply because that ideal has never been realized in actual practice on any community scale.

The doctrinal differences between Catholics and Jews are many, but to a certain extent only apparent. The treasure of the Jewish past, for instance, was always monotheism, the belief in one God. Our Trinitarian theology is rather frightening at first glance to those who for centuries preserved the credo of God's unity: "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord."[2]

The doctrine of the Trinity, however, does not form a part of the revelation of the Old Testament. Nevertheless, knowing the doctrine, through the revelation of Jesus Christ, it is possible for the Christian to look back and see the marvelous preparation for this mystery in certain Old Testament passages, for example, "Let *us* make man to *our* image and likeness," and "Behold, Adam is become as one of *us*."[3] But we should be careful of these and other like references lest we read into the text more than is there. The Old Testament contains only faint adumbrations — not a revelation — of the mystery of the Trinity.[4]

Jews find other difficulties about our Faith. Our devotion to the humanity of a God-Man seems strange — our devotion to the sufferings of the Crucifixion, for example. They are amazed at the doctrine of transubstantiation, at the very concept of consuming the Body and Blood of Christ. And always there is of course the hesitation to accept Christ as the Messiah — besides the almost infinitely wider abyss to cross, belief in His divinity. Is it possible that almighty God could have become man, fulfilled the office of Redeemer, been crucified, and passed away — and God's own Chosen Race not even know Him?

Lastly, we must not overlook an obstacle, which to non-Jews might seem superficial and slightly sentimental — the fear which besets many near-converts of being deserters to a cause, of being thought to have lost confidence in the introverted Judaism of today and seeking an annihilation of that Jewishness in Christian society.

Henri Bergson was a famed Jewish philosopher of our times who, faced with the Catholic Church and the divinity of Jesus, said: "Yes, it is true;" yet did not enter. He wrote in his last will and testament in 1937:

> My reflections have led me closer and closer to Catholicism, in which I see the complete fulfillment of Judaism. I should have become a convert, had I not seen for years (in great part, alas, through the fault of a certain number of Jews entirely deprived of moral sense) the formidable wave of anti-semitism which is to sweep over the world. I want to remain among those

[2]Deut. 6:4.
[3]Gen. 1:26; 3:22. Cf. also: Gen. 11:7; 18:1-3; and Isa. 6;3 & 8.
[4]Cf. F. Ceuppens, O.P., *Quaestiones Selectae Ex Historia Primaeva* (Rome: Angelicum, 1947), pg. 31.

> who tomorrow will be persecuted. But I hope that a Catholic priest will be good enough to come — if the Cardinal Archbishop of Paris authorizes it — to pray at my funeral. Should this authorization not be granted, it will be necessary to approach a rabbi, but without concealing from him, nor from anyone, my moral adherence to Catholicism, as well as my express and first desire to have the prayers of a Catholic priest.[5]

Jews do enter the Church. What then attracts those who come? When they leave their Judaism, what must they have to replace it? Their answer seems to be that in Catholicism they do not leave their Judaism at all, but find it explained and clarified and fulfilled in a way they had never known before. The Catholic Church is, after all, not a mere offshoot of the Jewish religion, cast out of the synagogue, but the flowering, the bearing of fruit, according to the scheme of the Holy Ghost. It is a kind of final cause of Judaism — in the plan of God, the first in intention and the last in execution.

We have said that Christ, as a divine Messiah, was a stumbling-block to many prospective Jewish converts. But let us add that in Christ we find a magnet as well. Many, many Jewish thinkers of today see in Christ a leader risen up out of the Jews for all of mankind. He is not divine, not messianic, but He is an ethical, and even a doctrinal teacher. In His cruel death, some rabbis say, we can find rich spiritual lessons of sacrifice and love.

Edmond Fleg, Jewish author who does not believe in the doctrines of the Catholic Church, yet can write: "Poor, crucified Jesus, for whom my childhood wept, beloved Jesus, whose bloodstained face I can never see in the darkness of some chapel, without trembling."[6] This is one of the paradoxes of Judaism: the muteness of centuries, and now His holy Name spoken today.

The apostolicity and universality of the Church, with its aim of a world society of men united in the Mystical Body and Communion of Saints by a divine, supernatural love, is something altogether foreign to traditional Jewish notions. Although some Jews have turned evangelical for their religion, for the most part, there still is no prosyletizing; converts to Judaism are few, and, it seems, moved mostly by the desire for a kind of martyrdom for the cause of world brotherhood.

There are other bridges by which we gain Jews. Our liturgy, in externals and in symbolism is a parallel to the ancient Jewish rites of the Temple, with a consecrated priesthood; a tabernacle, which is the residence of God on earth; the use of Scripture in common liturgical prayer, as in the Mass and Divine Office. And the fulfillment of the ancient Judaic prophecies: by Christ in His messianic mission, His Crucifixion, His Presence in the Blessed Sacrament; by Mary, the woman who would crush the serpent's head; by the Church, which would extend to

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[5]Quoted in John M. Oesterreicher: *Walls Are Crumbling* (New York: The Devin-Adair Company, 1952), p. 43. Bergson later died a Catholic death.

[6]Quoted in John M. Osterreicher: "The Apostolate to the Jews," *The Missionary Academia*, VI:4, (December, 1948) p. 74.

all nations and last to the end of time. These things are at least confirmations to the Christ-finding Jew of the continuity of the New Law with the Old, and God's abiding presence with the men He chose to love Him.

It is not enough then that we as Catholics have attained to the Paradise of union with Christ and with His Church. There are voices calling to us from the east side of Eden – calling, questioning, praying, affirming. All that is really lacking is initiative on our part, a greater spirit of sacrifice for Jewish souls, and a charity as fiery as St. Paul's, which first bridged the gap between ousted Christian Jews and the apostolate to win all of God's Chosen Race:

> I have great sadness and continuous sorrow in my heart. For I could wish to be anathema myself from Christ for the sake of my brethren, who are my kinsmen according to the flesh; who are Israelites, who have the adoption as sons, and the glory and the covenants and the legislation and the worship and the promises; who have the fathers, and from whom is the Christ according to the flesh, who is, over all things, God blessed forever, amen.[7]

In recent times the Church's overtures to the Jews as such have almost entirely ceased. Many Jews are converted. But let us note that it is the grace of God alone at work, for, unlike the Protestants, who fight for Jewish souls, we are doing almost nothing.

Our task is immense. We have to dispel the abysmal misinformation, ignorance, and false propaganda on things Catholic among Jews, and of things Jewish among Catholics. We must show them that we are the true growth of Judaism: by Christ's fulfillment of the messianic prophecies; by emphasizing how Christianity is the extension, the complement, the elevation, of the Jewish faith of the Mosaic Law. And we must pray and preach to them. Preach, to let them know that the Church wants them; pray, so that we may be convinced, each one, that Jews, who have always been peculiarly God's own, belong in the Church of Christ.

For they will enter someday. "I would not, brethren, have you ignorant of this mystery, lest you should be wise in your own conceits, that a partial blindness only has befallen Israel, until the full number of the Gentiles should enter, and thus all Israel should be saved."[8]

Why the apostolate to the Jews? Because there is earth in the Garden of Gethsemani and on the hill of Calvary sanctified by Jewish Blood. because Jews are our spiritual forebears living today. Because, having failed in the past, we must increase our efforts in the present and in the future in the spirit of St. Dominic, who prayed long hours for them in those nightly vigils he was so prone to. Because Christ Himself was born among the Jews, lived His life among them, choosing to bring His gifts first to them: "I was not sent but to the lost sheep of the House of Israel."[9]

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[7]Rom. 9:2-5.
[8]Rom. 11:25-26.
[9]Matt. 15:24.

Nineteen hundred years ago, the Jew was expelled from the Holy City in the Dispersal to make his way alone over the earth, looking always, with a great longing, to that return to Jerusalem. And when each year brings around the time of Passover, although there is no priest and no sacrifice, still that prayer, that heartfelt wish, comes in the Paschal liturgy to the lips of the Orthodox Jew: "Next year—next year in Jerusalem . . . O rebuild the Holy City in our days and lead us thereto."

For nineteen hundred years the Jew has been outside the pale of the Promise of God. Somehow the Jewish instinct knows it, but being without the Christian Faith, cannot know the reason why. The pious Jew recites the Psalm: "How shall we sing a canticle to the Lord in a strange land?"[10] not knowing that he is outside Eden because he is outside the Church in which there is no strange land and no man is alone.

And us? Our responsibility should stand out clearly before our eyes. To pray and to preach. We cannot work miracles; grace works the miracles. But God's plan for His Chosen People makes it imperative that the message of Christianity be brought before them.

> How are they to call upon him in whom they have not believed? But how are they to believe in him of whom they have not heard? And how are they to hear if no one preach to them?
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> Woe unto me if I preach not the Gospel . . .[11]

Gilbert Roxburgh, O.P.

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[10]Ps. 136:4.
[11]Rom. 10:14 and I Corinthians 9:16.

JOHN HUS: NATIONALIST AND HERETIC

THE SACRED COLLEGE of Cardinals meeting on April 8, 1378 elected Bartholomew Prignani to the papacy. He took the name of Urban and became the sixth pope to be so named. Soon after the election, the Cardinals began to doubt its validity because of fear brought on by an hysterical Roman mob clamoring for the election of a Roman pope. Slowly, the Cardinals left Rome and finally met in Fondi, well out of the reach of Urban VI, where on September 20, 1378 they again cast ballots for a pope, electing Robert of Geneva as Clement VII. Here briefly, we have the origin of that distressing period of history known as the Great Western Schism.[1] The schism kept Christendom divided till the election of Odo Colonna, Martin V, on November 11, 1417, which took place during the Council of Constance. In the election of Martin V the Council achieved one of its objectives: the ending of the schism. The two other aims of the Council centered about the reform of the Church in its head and members and the suppression of the heresies of John Wyclif and John Hus.[2] A summary treatment of the latter is the concern of this article.

Usually, 1369 is given as the year in which Hus was born. His birth took place in Southern Bohemia in the village of Husinetz, from which village he probably acquired the surname, Hus. Exactly when he went to Prague cannot be stated with certitude. From the University of Prague he received the degrees of Bachelor of Arts in 1393 and Bachelor of Theology in 1394. In the year 1396 he won entrance into the ranks of the Masters in Art. Though Hus never attained the laurels of the doctorate, his influence at the University of Prague remained strong and at times decisive. The Archbishop of Prague ordained him a priest

[1]Philip Hughes, *A History of the Church* (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1947), vol. III, p. 229-236.

[2]H. J. Schroeder, O.P., *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils* (St. Louis and London: B. Herder Book Co., 1937), p. 443.

in 1400, even though He had not finished his theological studies.[3] At the Council of Constance this proved to be most unfortunate because Hus and the theologians of the Council would be interpreting doctrines in different ways.[4]

In his student days Hus became familiar with the writings of John Wyclif, for these works had found their way into Prague as a consequence of the cordial relations existing between the universities of Oxford and Prague and especially through the Czech students who studied at Oxford. The year 1382 had witnessed the marriage between Anne of Bohemia and Richard II of England as well as the condemnation of Wyclif's writings by the Council of London, which, however, in no way hampered the spread of the heresy of Wyclif into Prague. Though Hus modified some of the teachings of Wyclif to suit his own taste, the passage of time would reveal Hus as the best exponent, defender, and imitator of Wyclif's teachings and writings.

Two years after his ordination Hus began his career as a preacher in Bethlehem Chapel. The chapel was established for the express purpose of having a church in Prague in which the Czech language was used exclusively in all sermons. From the pulpit of this chapel Hus preached his ideas on reform which possessed some resemblance to those of Wyclif. The new Archbishop Zbynek, who took possession of his See in October 1403, did not openly censure Hus, even though the ecclesiastical authorities of Prague condemned the writings of Wyclif in the same year. The Archbishop, indeed, proved to be favorable to Hus by appointing him as the preacher for the next synod to be held in Prague. For one thing, the prelate saw in Hus a man who might well prove to be useful in his plans to effect some definite and necessary reforms in the lives of the clergy. However, another opinion believes the Archbishop failed to see all the heretical implications in the preaching of Hus owing to the fact that his own theological knowledge was somewhat imperfect.[5]

To the condemnation of 1403 Hus voiced his approval and claimed that he would condemn all the errors found in the writings of Wyclif. However, the good intentions of Hus to abide by the decision of the Church soon faltered. For in 1405 Innocent VII wrote to the Archbishop of Prague about the spread of heresy in his See City. Again the Church authorities of Prague condemned the writings of the English heretic. Against this condemnation Hus uttered a protest. The hopes of the Archbishop concerning Hus began to dim. As yet Hus did not openly reject the authority of the Church. The matter of heretical

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[3]According to Rashdall, the priest trained in theology was the exception rather than the rule. See his *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages* (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1936), vol. II, p. 449-452.

[4]P. David, "Boheme," *Dictionnaire D'Histoire et de Géographie Ecclésiastiques*, IX, 447.

[5]Charles-Joseph Hefele and H. Leclercq, *Histoire des Conciles* (Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ane, 1916), t. VII, prem. partie, p. 124.

teachings and preaching came to the attention of Rome once more in 1408. Gregory XII instructed Archbishop Zbynek to stop the spread of heresy. The Archbishop then issued a decree requiring all those possessing copies of Wyclif's writings to submit them to the ecclesiastical authorities for inspection. Hus surrendered his copies claiming that he condemned all their errors. But unfortunately, he never agreed with the Church on precisely what errors were contained in the writings of Wyclif.

The Council of Pisa meeting in 1409 played an important part in the life of Hus and the University of Prague. In its attempt to end the schism the Council "deposed" the two contenders for the papacy, Gregory XII and Benedict XIII, and elected Alexander V. Needless to say, the Roman Pope, Gregory XII, and the Avignon Pope, Benedict XIII, ignored their deposition by the Council of Pisa. Europe now witnessed the sad spectacle of there men, one in Rome, another in Avignon, and a third in Pisa, each claiming to be and acting as the lawful successor of Saint Peter. From this triangular dispute the prestige of the papacy fell to a new low; and the authority of the papacy was to be left in a weakened condition for centuries.

For political reasons King Wenceslaus of Bohemia proclaimed himself neutral and hoped to secure the sanction of the University of Prague for his neutrality policy. However, Archbishop Zbynek with the three German *nations* of the university recognized Gregory XII as the true pope. Hus and his followers expressed themselves as favoring the neutrality policy of their king. In order to secure the approval of the university the king changed the distribution of the voting among the *nations* by giving three votes to the Czech *nation* and one vote to the remaining three. The Germans protested such overt and gross discrimination. Their threat to leave the university failed to have the desired effect. Consequently, in May of 1409, the Germans left Prague, some going to the Universities of Heidelberg and Cologne while others established the University of Leipzig.[6] This exodus of the German professors and students left the University of Prague, with Hus as its new rector, standing as a citadel of Wyclifism in the heart of Central Europe. Hus now enjoyed the zenith of his power and influence.

Shortly after the departure of the Germans, King Wenceslaus pledged his obedience to the Pisan Pope, Alexander V. In this matter Hus again followed the example of his king. Archbishop Zbynek realized that if any success was to be had in his dealings with Hus, he would have to recognize Alexander V as the true pope. Hence, he changed his allegiance from Gregory XII to Alexander V.[7] Once Alexander received the allegiance of both the civil and ecclesiastical rulers in Bohemia he acted decisively to suppress the heresy then causing so much disturbance in Prague. On December 20, 1409, Alexander issued a papal bull in which

[6]Rashdall, *op. cit.*, p. 136.
[7]Hefele and Leclercq, *op. cit.*, p. 136.

he ordered that the works of Wyclif be collected, his errors retracted, and the preaching of those errors stopped. All who failed to conform to the decree fell under papal interdict. The papal bull arrived in Prague in the month of March, 1410. But before Hus could formulate his protest, Alexander died on May 3; and two weeks later John XXIII became the second Pisan anti-pope.

Hus soon wrote to John XXIII petitioning him to mitigate the rigor of the papal bull issued by Alexander V. Before an answer could be received from Pisa, Archbishop Zbynek excommunicated Hus and his followers on July 16, 1410. King Wenceslaus then wrote to John XXIII requesting that the excommunication against Hus be removed. During the time of waiting for a response from John XXIII, Hus kept on preaching the errors of Wyclif with the result that he fell also under the papal interdict. But neither the interdict nor the excommunication worried the heretic; the King and Queen favored him and that seemed a sufficient guarantee of safety.

John XXIII realized that to attempt to quell the gathering storm in Prague by writing letters would be futile. Instead of giving Hus any definite answer concerning his request regarding the decree of Alexander V, the anti-pope asked Hus to come to his curia where he would be given ample opportunity to remove the accusation of heresy lodged against his preaching. Hus declined the invitation. But he did send representatives to John XXIII to plead his cause. King Wenceslaus, moreover, desired that any formal questioning of Hus take place within the confines of his territory. The frustrated John XXIII then committed the entire matter regarding Hus to the care of Cardinal Colonna. Negotiations failed and resulted in the excommunication of Hus by the Cardinal for contempt of papal authority in February of 1411. Archbishop Zbynek on March 15, 1411 also excommunicated Hus for the second time.

In the same letter which protested the legislation of the papal bull by Alexander V, Hus asserted that all charges of heresy against him were false and that he longed for the opportunity to prove the soundness of his doctrine before the University of Prague and in the presence of all the prelates of Bohemia. Other things that Hus wrote during that time contradicted the noble sentiments of that letter.[10] The work *De Libris Haereticorum Legendis* denounced the condemnation of Wyclif's works and openly negated the authority of tradition. Not tradition as defined by the Church but Scripture as interpreted by Hus was to be the intermediary or norm in these matters. The works *De Ablatione Temporalium Clericis* and *De Decimis* proposed the pernicious teaching of Wyclif that the right to property and the power to rule depended upon the person being in the state of grace.[11]

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[8]*Ibid.*, p. 140.
[9]*Ibid.*
[10]*Ibid.*, p. 143.
[11]*Ibid.*

The papal bull of John XXIII announcing the crusade against Ladislaus of Naples, published in May, 1412, effected the complete rupture between Hus and the Church. Preachers for the crusade arrived in Prague to secure funds for the undertaking and to grant indulgences to all who bestowed alms. On June 7, Hus preached against the bull as being in contradiction to the law of Christ, which, he maintained, each person's conscience must interpret for himself.[12] Owing to the vehement preaching of Hus, his followers attacked the preachers and inflicted bodily injuries upon some. The king, realizing that such a flagrant exhibition of contempt for papal authority had to be punished for the good of public order and safety, ordered that a trial be held for the three men arrested. When the court found them guilty, the king ordered their execution. In the eulogy preached by Hus, these men received the accolade reserved for martyrs!

When the news of the abuse heaped upon the preachers as well as the latest heretical outburst reached the curia of John XXIII, the Pisan Pope again excommunicated Hus with his followers and placed Hus under interdict. This in no way bothered or disquieted the heretic who continued to preach to all who came to hear him in Bethlehem Chapel. Since Hus' contempt for papal authority knew no bounds, Archbishop Zbynek threatened to place the entire populace of Prague under interdict as long as Hus remained in the city. Only at the request of the king did Hus finally withdraw. But after retiring from Prague he continued his preaching throughout the villages and towns of Bohemia and won over to his cause many more adherents who remained loyal to him even after his condemnation by the Church as a formal heretic. The Hussite Wars measured the extreme fanatacism of their loyalty.

In order to understand just why Hus attained such popularity and inspired such loyalty, despite the interdict, it is necessary to outline briefly some of the factors setting the stage upon which Hus played his part.

Throughout the centuries, the mandate of Christ to preach to all nations has found expression within the Church's vast missionary endeavors which sent Boniface to Germany, Augustine to England, Patrick to Ireland, and Cyril and Methodius to Bohemia. In addition to the faith, the two saintly brothers gave to the Czech people a liturgy using the Slavonic language. For the Czechs this particular liturgy always remained a sacred bequest to be kept and preserved, cost what it may. The migration of the Germans into the country soon brought pleas to Rome for legislation favoring the use of Latin in the liturgy; this the Czechs neither forgot nor forgave. Once Latin commenced to be used in Bohemia, the Czechs and Germans began to look at each other with unfriendly eyes. From the eleventh century onward the use of the Slavonic language in the liturgy became a rallying point of Czech

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 145.
[13] *Ibid.* p. 146-8.

national sentiment against the Teutonic element within Bohemia.[14] The custom of receiving communion under both species, also probably coming from Saints Cyril and Methodius, never fell into complete disuse as it did in other parts of the Church; the Roman legislation against the chalice for the laity failed to secure total acceptance in Bohemia.[15]

Coupled with the disputes over the language of the liturgy and the laity's use of the chalice is the fact that different heretical sects of the Middle Ages found their way into Bohemia before 1250. As early as 1135, the Archbishop of Prague received a reprimand for not seeking out the heretics in his diocese.[16] The Catharists and Waldenses were certainly among the predominant sects, the Waldenses acquiring their greatest strongholds in Southern Bohemia where Hus was born. As a result of the activity of these sects, lay preachers enjoyed a certain vogue and implanted deeply their doctrines of evangelical poverty, of equality between priest and layman, of contempt for ecclesiastical authority and ecclesiastical institutions. All these sects taught that the true Church was invisible rather than visible.[17]

Undoubtedly, one of the most important factors setting the stage for Hus stemmed from the scandalous conditions then prevalent among some of the clergy. The laity generously endowed the Church, but instead of freeing the clergy from the concern for their temporal needs, it only increased their solicitude for the things of this world. Following in the wake of their anxiety for worldly possessions came moral decay, ruin of the apostolic spirit, and neglect of pastoral duties, especially of preaching the word of God to the people.[18] The Waldensian preachers took great delight in pointing out the vast differences existing between the poverty of the Apostles (the poverty the Waldenses professed to observe) and the vast wealth possessed by some of the clergy. Concerning the matter of clerical celibacy, the legislation of Rome was known, but at times disdainfully ignored by some of the clergy.[19] Concurrently with this depressing state of the clergy, there existed a strong desire for reform among the hierarchy, joined to that of certain zealous priests who labored and preached for the same goal. Among these zealous preachers for reform two prepared the way for John Hus; hence, they merit our consideration.

The first of the two was John Milicz who stood apart from his clerical confreres by his holiness of life and his active apostolate to the sick, the poor, and the imprisoned. The custom of preaching exclusively in the Czech language began with him. The innovation proved to be so popular that he had to preach two or three times daily to satisfy the

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[14]David, *op. cit.*, 425.
[15]Hefele and Leclercq, *op. cit.*, p. 112.
[16]Ronald A. Knox, *Enthusiasm* (New York & London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p. 89.
[17]*Ibid.*, p. 109-13.
[18]David, *op. cit.*, 446.
[19]Hefele and Leclercq, *op. cit.*, p. 112.

demands of all his listeners. Unfortunately, some of his statements savored of a slight disregard for the authority of the hierarchy. Gregory XI called him to Avignon where he died in 1374, five years after the birth of Hus.[20]

After Milicz died the work of reform continued with Matthias of Janow. Like Milicz he was a priest who sought to reform the abuses prevalent during his day. However, he wanted to reform the Church by rejecting vestments, statues, relics, papal and episcopal authority, and to restore the chalice to the laity, not, however, out of a sense of devotion but rather as a means of protesting the privileges of the clergy. With the Waldenses he hankered for the simplicity of the primitive Church. Before Luther ever started his preaching, Matthias of Janow stated the essence of Protestantism: Scripture as the sole rule of faith, Christ as the unique mediator between God and men. While the preaching of John Milicz and Matthias of Janow prepared the way for Hus in Prague, the writings and preaching of Thomas Stitny, a disciple of Matthias of Janow, prepared the way for Hus in the rural areas of Bohemia.[21]

All these factors helped Hus to achieve his success. But to make that success dependent solely upon these conditions would be to underestimate the man and the qualities which he possessed. As a reformer he continued in the tradition of John Milicz and Matthias of Janow; as a preacher his eloquence knew no equal; as a patriot he ranked with the most militant of his day.

When Hus stood in the pulpit of Bethlehem Chapel and surveyed the sad condition of the papacy as well as the scandalous lives of some of the clergy, he realized that reform was needed. But he did violence to sound doctrine in his attempt to bring about the needed reform. That which Hus inaugurated with zeal in the beginning, soon degenerated into fanaticism. According to Hus the evil lives of the clergy rendered the sacraments worthless;[22] the authority of the pope depended upon the civil power as well as upon the personal holiness of the pope; and a single authority in spiritual matters was unnecessary.[23] Moreover, Hus stripped the Church of her authority to punish a person through excommunication or interdict by maintaining that such procedures stemmed from the anti-Christ.[24] With Wyclif he taught that the powers and rights which a person might have depend upon that person's being in the state of grace.[25] His objectives were noble; his theology was erroneous; and the end result of his work was not a reform of the Church in Bohemia, but almost a complete destruction of it.

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[20]*Ibid.*, p. 117.
[21]*Ibid.*, p. 117-9.
[22]Denzinger, n. 634.
[23]*Ibid.*, nn. 635, 638, 653.
[24]*Ibid.*, nn. 643, 644, 645.
[25]*Ibid.*, n. 656.

While previous reformers possessed ability as preachers by which they attracted large followings, Hus enjoyed that flair of genius which captivated the entire Bohemian nation and rendered the people an ever attentive audience. He utilized his oratical ability not only to preach his ideas on reform but also to voice his nationalism: his dislike of the Germans. The large German colony at the University refused to accept Wyclif's teachings in their pure form or even in their modified form as taught by Hus; this intensified the cleavage between the two national groups. Moreover, with the lesser Czech nobles, Hus lamented the fact that the largest landowners, the most prosperous shopkeepers, and the most influential nobles were all of German blood.[26] When Hus wedded his desire for reform to his militant nationalism, one wonders if the polished speech of the orator did not too easily degenerate into the emotional harangue of the demagogue.

The people and clergy in Bohemia did not remain indifferent to Hus. By the time he left for the Council of Constance, the two camps containing his friends and foes were already in existence. The Franciscans, Dominicans, several of the diocesan clergy, and some of the Czech doctors at the University actively opposed Hus; the vast majority of the people, the lesser nobles, and the King all favored him. With the passing of time, conditions only grew worse within the country. But the Emperor Sigismund, with the hope of restoring peace in Bohemia, invited Hus to attend the proposed council to be held in the free city of Constance.[27] The Emperor promised him a writ of safe conduct for the journey to Constance, a matter that has to be considered briefly by us.

The safe-conduct letter exempted Hus from certain imperial taxes levied upon travellers who had to use toll roads and bridges in journeying from one part of the empire to another. In no way or manner could the letter grant immunity to Hus from an unfavorable judgment at Constance, or from any punishment imposed upon him as a result of such judgment; this Hus knew. Although he had not received the letter of safe-conduct when he left Prague for Constance, he travelled under the protection of three Czech knights who received explicit orders from the Emperor to serve as his escort on the journey to the Council. Hus arrived in Constance on November 3, 1414; the letter of safe-conduct arrived in Constance two days later. The fact that Hus willingly left the protective confines of Bohemia without the letter of safe-conduct in his personal possession cannot be overlooked.[28] For Hus, the Council represented not so much a group of men who were to pass judgment on the orthodoxy of his writings and preaching, but rather a select gathering of ecclesiastics who were to be won over to his ideas on Church reform.[29]

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[26]Veit Valentin, *The German People: Their History and Culture from the Holy Roman Empire to the Third Reich* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1951), p. 130.

[27]J. Wilhem, *"Hus," The Catholic Encyclopedia,* VII, 585.

[28]Hefele and Leclercq, *op. cit.;* pp. 340-50 contain a lengthy treatment of the whole affair of the safe conduct.

[29]A. Baudrillart, "Constance (Concile De)," *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique,* III, prem. partie, 1214.

Shortly after his arrival in Constance, John XXIII granted Hus an audience in which he lifted the sentences of excommunication, forbidding him, however, to say Mass or to preach. In keeping with his denial of papal authority, Hus ignored the prohibition and publicly preached his views on Church reform. John XXIII counteracted this latest challenge to papal authority by having the heretic confined to his quarters and kept under surveillance – he languished in no dungeon while awaiting his trial – and during this time Hus wrote many letters to his followers in Bohemia. His partisans at Constance quickly voiced their protest to the Emperor Sigismund when he arrived at Constance in January, 1415. To their minds, such an action violated the letter of safe-conduct given to Hus. The Emperor, displeased at Hus' confinement, demanded his immediate release. However, when John XXIII gave the reason for the arrest of Hus, the Emperor ceased his agitation for the release of the Czech lest the functioning of the Council be disrupted. In an attempt to satisfy the disappointed disciples of Hus, the Emperor promised to have Hus brought to trial as soon as possible.[30]

On June 5, 1415 the Council's agenda called for the first interrogation of Hus in which his teachings on the Church provided the matter for questioning. The theologians of the Council prepared a list of errors extracted from Hus' works and asked him if he had written these things. Although he admitted his authorship, Hus claimed that these statements had been extracted in such a way that the qualifying and explanatory sentences he had also included could not fulfill their function of interpreting these statements as erroneous. In other words, Hus accused the theologians of quoting his works out of context. A second interrogation, as futile as the first, followed on the next day. All the arguments and rebuttals ended in failure; Hus consistently refused to admit his errors.

The Czech demanded that the theologians of the Council base their refutation of his teachings on scriptural foundations. In this demand, the errors in Hus' reasoning stood out in all their glaring conspicuousness. In his teaching on the members and nature of the Church, Hus denied the teaching of Christ concerning this very matter as related in the thirteenth chapter of Saint Matthew's gospel.[31] For his teaching that the laity receive the entire Christ in the Eucharist only under both species, Hus advanced no irrefragable proof based on Scripture.[32] His constant utterance of willing submission to the judgment of the Church lost its note of sincerity by his adamant refusal to acknowledge his errors as listed by the Church he claimed to obey.

On June 8, the members of the Council once again attempted to move Hus to recant his erorrs; they failed. Knowingly or not, Hus made the principle of subjectivism his criterion in religious matters; for him, the authority of the individual carried the same force as that of the

[30]Hefele and Leclercq, *op. cit.*, p. 257.

[31]Charles Journet, *L'Eglise du Verbe Incarne* (Paris: Desclee, de Brouwer et Cie, 1951), vol. II, p. 72.

[32]Denz., nn. 626, 930, 932. Cf. also Emmanuel Doronzo, O.M.I., *De Eucharistia* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Co., 1947), t I, pp 536-70.

Universal Church. The theologians of the Council soon realized that Hus had no intention of abandoning his erorrs. Yet to allow him to go free and to preach his doctrines would be to threaten the entire civil and ecclesiastical structure of that day, and would invite social and civil anarchy. Even that astute politician, Emperor Sigismund, perceived the dangers inherent in the teaching of Hus which demanded that a person be in the state of grace before that person could lawfully possess property or exercise any authority. Quite understandably, such a demand found no favor with the Emperor. Whether moved by sincere conviction or by profound pride, Hus never retracted the errors he had acquired during his student days and had preached during his later years.

On July 6, 1415, Hus heard his sentence of condemnation read; the State now had the obligation to punish him. Even then some of the members of the Council pleaded and argued with the heretic in a final attempt to win him back to the truth. Hus went to his death with a calm and self-possession that is rare among those condemned to die. Whether he considered himself a martyr for the truth or a victim of ecclesiastical politicians, he played the role of his choice with consummate skill. Some doubted the guilt of the man owing to his sincerity and the manner in which he faced his execution. But with the publication of the bull *Inter Cunctas* by Martin V, all doubts concerning his guilt were removed. Hus was a heretic justly condemned.

When the Hussites in Bohemia heard of the death of their leader and hero, they organized their forces to vindicate the honor of their champion and the dignity of their nation, both of which, in their minds, suffered ridicule at Constance. Under the brilliant military strategy of John Ziska, and later under Procop the Little with Procop the Great, the Czechs converted their country into a fortress that withstood for thirty years the onslaughts of various crusades, and likewise provided a base for the Hussite brigands whose expeditions into Hungary, Saxony, and Silesia left death, destruction, and desolation in their wake. Not until the battle of May 30, 1434, were the Hussite forces permanently crushed, never again to be a threat to the peace of Europe. With their defeat, the Czech peoples experienced a political eclipse that lasted until they established the Republic of Czechoslovakia after the first World War. Their revolt cost them dearly.

The story of John Hus and his followers ended on a note of tragedy. But the tragedy was not simply the crushing defeat inflicted on the Hussite forces in 1434; nor was it the later breakup of the followers of Hus into the sects of Adamites, Taborites, Utraquists, and the Brethren of the Unity; nor yet is the real tragedy seen in the fact that most Protestants in modern Czechoslovakia have embraced Calvinism or Lutheranism, instead of establishing a separate Hussite Church. The true tragedy of Hus and his followers can be found in the fact that instead of gathering with Him who is the Way and the Truth, Hus and his followers scattered.

Matthias Simlik, O.P.

DOMINICANS IN THE COUNCIL OF TRENT

THE COUNCIL OF TRENT was the answer to the incessant clamor for reform which went up from zealous men – saints and malcontents – during the preceding two hundred years.

It was a great and necessary work. The moral and disciplinary structure of the Church was in need of real reform. The perverse efforts of Luther and his kind had not helped; but they did force upon the men of the time the urgency of their task. In addition to the moral and disciplinary reform there was a need for a new clarification of doctrinal issues, both to condemn the errors of the innovators and to point out the proper way for Catholic apologists, not a few of whom were better noted for zeal than for knowledge of Catholic doctrine. It is with this latter need that we are concerned, for it is here that the Church found in the Dominican Order a ready instrument for the work to be done.

The fourteenth century brought a marked change in the life of the Church. Her moral authority declined, and the way was prepared for a day when heresy and revolt from the Church would not be looked upon with horror by the generality of men. The more frequent recourse to the secular arm in the suppression of heresy paved the way for a day when the secular arm would usurp the power to determine what is heresy: for the state dominated churches of the Protestant Revolution.

With the other great institutions of the Middle Ages, the Dominican Order had fallen upon evil days. The decline of regular life brought with it a decline in the doctrinal mission of the Order. There were indeed saints; but they were for the most part too busy with the pressing needs of the time to devote themselves to scholarship. To some this might seem a mistake, but we must not forget that the doctrinal mission of the Order involves a corporate effort. Works such as the *Summa* are done by individuals, but not as a rule by hermits.

Fortunately, the reform of the Order preceded that of the Church as a whole. It began in the last years of the fourteenth century in

Northern Italy and spread slowly — very slowly — to the rest of the Order. With the reform of the Order came a revival of the spirit of Saint Thomas and his contemporaries. In the fifteenth century we find a few men returning to the serious pursuit of theology, a few men who show an awareness of the problems of the time and who, due to improved conditions of religious life, are able to apply themselves seriously to study. Such, for example, are Saint Antoninus, Capreolus, and Juan de Torquemada.[1] At the turn of the century we encounter men of the calibre of Cajetan and Sylvester of Ferrara — hardly the fruits of decadence — and the theological renaissance of the sixteenth century has begun.

Some have placed the center of this movement at Paris; but the revival of Thomism at Paris during the first years of the sixteenth century was the effect of a general trend, not a cause.[2] Paris was still in a sense the center of theological learning — many of the Spanish and Portugese students continued to go to Saint Jacques until Salamanca became under Vitoria the recognized leader.[3] But it was not the Paris of the thirteenth century. The great medieval center of theology had suffered badly from the inroads made by nominalism and conciliarism.

Perhaps the most striking thing about this revival is its inter-national character, which had been preserved in the Order in spite of the rising nationalism of the time. It was to bear fruit in the unanimity of theological thought which made the Order a dominant force at the Council of Trent.

The mere number of Dominicans who figured in the work of the Council of Trent is impressive. Adding the lists of the three epochs we get a total of eight archbishops, thirty-one bishops, seventy-seven theologians, five procurators and two Masters General of the Order. The total of 124 is a little high since those who figured in more than one epoch are counted for each epoch in which they were active; there are twelve of these. On the other hand this does not include those fathers of the Order who worked in Rome. The actual number was probably about 130.[4]

Numbers alone are less important than the actual work done; the most signifant of them are the numbers of archbishops and bishops,

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[1]Torquemada's *Summa de Ecclesia* provides an excellent example of the application of the doctrine of Saint Thomas to the problems of the time, in marked contrast to the sterile haggling of many fifteenth century scholastics.

[2]". . . *no responde a la realidad histórica* la vinculación a Pedro de Crokart y a Santiago de París *el despertar* de la nueva Escolastica, *pues todo lo dicho le precede en el tiempo y es independiente en el espacio.* Lo de Santiago de París es mas bien *efecto y no causa; es una* de las manifestaciones de esa restauración teológica *que venía a través de la Orden Dominicana.*" Venancio D. Carro, O.P., *Los Dominicos y el Concilio de Trento* [Salamanca, 1948] pag. 18.

[3]Both Vitoria and Domingo de Soto studied at Paris, as did the Portugese theologians Francisco Foreiro, Jorge de Santiago and Gaspar de los Reyes. On the other hand Pedro de Soto, Bartolomé Carranza, Martín de Córdoba y Mendoza, Bartolomé de los Martires and Melchor Cano completed their studies in Spain and Portugal. All of these men, with the exception of Vitoria, were active at Trent.

[4]Carro, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-51.

for these – a thing which is overlooked by some historians – were *members* of the Council. The majority of the Dominican bishops were from Italy, where the state of clerical learning was such that clerics skilled in theology were rare outside of the religious orders. Most of the Spanish fathers were present at the Council as theologians.[5]

As to the effect of the Dominicans upon the course of the Council we may say without hesitation that it was a triumph for the trend of theological thought which they represented: that of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Leo XIII wrote in *Aeterni Patris:*

> But now we come to the greatest glory of Thomas, a glory which is altogether his own, and shared with no other Catholic Doctor. In the midst of the council of Trent, the assembled Fathers so willing it, the *Summa* of Thomas Aquinas lay open upon the altar, with the Holy Scriptures and the decrees of the Supreme Pontiffs, that from it might be sought counsel and reasons and answers.[6]

This by no means implies the canonization of a school of theology, or of a particular doctor. It involved rather a spirit wholly consonant with the general outlines of Thomistic theology. The definitions of the Council reflect his doctrines and principles, his spirit, in such wise that Thomists could say with all truth, "we are not embarrassed." The Council did not indeed go as far as some Thomists would have liked; but in the general way that councils are wont to follow it stayed within the outlines laid down by Saint Thomas. Carefully avoiding many fine points which were controverted among Catholics, they stated the fundamental doctrines of the Church, and condemned the errors of the Protestants. Their definitions were such that the followers of Saint Thomas did not find it necessary to revise their position even on remote and controverted points. It was enough.

Important though the work of the Order was, there was nothing spectacular about it. Councils are anonymous, and the work of those fathers who took part in it involved the dogged and painstaking work of the council chamber, hours of discussion, careful preparation and revision of decrees. It is work which is easily overlooked by the writers of history manuals.

It is worthwhile to point out a few particular cases where the Dominicans intervened. In the first epoch they and the other Thomists pre-

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[5]The fact that there were fewer Spaniards among the bishops may be attributed to two causes: the reform of the Church in Spain under Cardinal Cisneros had by this time born fruit in a higher level of clerical education; and the bishops of Spain were nominated by the king. A religious can refuse a king's nomination; the Italian Dominicans were less able to avoid nominations to bishoprics, both because of the pressing need and because religious do not ordinarily refuse orders from the Pope. Most of the Spaniards who were active in the Council were there as theologians. In addition to the Spanish and Italian bishops there were present in the council: Janos Kolosvari, bishop of Czanad and procurator for the bishops of Hungary; Balthasar Wanemann, bishop of Meissen (Germany); and Eugene O'Hairt, bishop of Achonry (Ireland).

[6]Translation from the English Summa [New York: Benziger Bros., 1947] vol. 1, pag. xiv.

vailed with much difficulty in the formation of the decree on original sin. It was a question which demanded the utmost care and precision. Luther's errors on this point were fundamental to his whole system, and he was hardly isolated in his confusion. There were within the Church, indeed within the Council, many whose notions of original sin were uncomfortably close to those of Luther. Fray Domingo de Soto, who certainly knew the thought of the time[7], wrote in his *De Natura et Gratia:*

> Nor are they now lacking, not only from the tribe of Lutherans (for they are broken up into diverse creeds), but even among those who call themselves Catholics, who going from Homer to a place among theologians, maintain that original sin is nothing, or that it is not truly and properly sin.[8]

A clarification of the question was certainly needed. It was necessary to reaffirm the existence and reality of original sin, its origin and its effects, as well as the remedy. In addition the errors of Luther demanded a clear explanation of the relationship between concupiscence and original sin.

Saint Thomas had, in his treatment of original sin, safely avoided both the tendencies toward defeatism of some twelfth century theologians and the *nominalism* of Abelard and those who would follow him. Both of these tendencies were very much alive in the sixteenth century.[9] The solution of Saint Thomas was based upon a clear knowledge of the nature of man and a faithful adherence to revealed truth as found in Scripture and tradition. Always careful to distinguish between the order of nature and the order of grace, he was able to distinguish the proper effects of original sin from the defects which flow from human nature. These latter are indirect effects of original sin and pertain to the material rather than to the formal element of original sin.[10]

The Fathers of the Council, in their final decree, followed the lines drawn by Saint Thomas. This was not done without strong opposition.

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[7]Domingo de Soto had studied at Paris, where he was converted to Thomism from nominalism. After his return to Spain he entered the Dominican Order at Burgos, in 1525. He was active at Trent both as a theologian for Charles V and, for a time, as a member of the Council, representing the Dominican Master General.

[8]"Nec desunt modo, non solum ex Lutheranorum prosapia (nam sunt in diversa symbola discissi) verum ex numero etiam eorum, qui se Catholicos arbitrantur, qui ex Homero inter Theologos prodeuntes, sustinere pergunt, vel nullum esse originale peccatum, vel non vere et proprie esse culpam . . ." (*de Natura et Gratia* [Venetiis: Apud Floravantem a Prato, 1584] lib. I, Cap. vii, pag. 30b.)

[9]The defeatism of many with respect to man after the Fall flowed in part from an extremely idealistic picture of man before the Fall, evolved by men who were not apparently content to limit themselves to the data of revelation. The principle followed by Saint Thomas in this matter is clearly enuntiated in the *Summa Theologiae,* part I, qu. 99, art. 1: "By faith alone do we hold truths which are above nature, and what we believe rests on authority. Wherefore, in making any assertions, we must be guided by the nature of things, except in those things which are above nature and are made known to us by Divine authority." (transl. by the English Dominicans [New York: Benziger Bros., 1947]).

[10]"Nevertheless a certain inclination to an inordinate act does follow from original sin, not directly, but indirectly, viz. by the removal of the obstacle, i.e., original justice, which hindered inordinate movements." (*Summa Theol.,* I-II, qu. 83, art. 1 ad 3; see also art. 3)

For example, the expression "For in those who are born again God hates nothing,"[11] was sharply impugned by many, including Seripando, the General of the Augustinians and one of the greatest figures of the Council.[12] The phrase remained, a clear statement that the renovation of Baptism is total, that the baptized are "made innocent, pure, guiltless and beloved of God."[13] They proceed, in the same place, to strike at the roots of the confusion by declaring that concupiscence, although an effect of original sin, is by no means to be identified with it.[14]

They scored again in the formation of the decree on justification; and again only after long and heated discussion. The Thomists were unanimous in their opposition to a double justice and to *de congruo* merit preceding justification; the final decree faithfully reflects their position.[15] An allied question was also raised in this sixth session, that of the certitude of grace. Saint Thomas prevailed again,[16] although here the Dominicans encountered a dissenter in their own ranks; the autodidactic Ambrosius Catherinus, the "enfant terrible" of the first epoch.[17]

In the doctrine on the sacraments the *Decretum ad Armenos* of the Council of Florence was cited by the Council. This decree of Florence, while not a definition, represented the ordinary magisterium of the Church. It was, as the editors of the *Enchiridion Symbolorum* note, "taken almost literally from Saint Thomas' *opuscule de articulis fidei et Ecclesiae Sacramentis.*"[18] The accord between the Council and Saint Thomas on the sacraments is too well known to require further discussion.

The Dominicans were divided on one question, as was the Council itself. The question of the divine law in the institution and residence of the episcopacy was raised early in the Council and continued to be

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[11]The Council of Trent, Session V, Decree Concerning Original Sin. (Transl. from Schroeder, *Canons and Decrees of the Council of Trent* [St. Louis: B. Herder Book Co., 1941] pag. 23.)

[12]Carro, *op. cit.*, pag. 154.

[13]Trent, *loc. cit.*

[14]"This concupiscence, which the Apostle sometimes calls sin, the holy council declares the Catholic Church has never understood to be called sin in the sense that it is truly and properly sin in those born again but in the sense that it is of sin and inclines to sin. But if anyone is of the contrary opinion, let him be anathema." *Ibid.*

[15]"And we are therefore said to be justified gratuitously, because none of those things that precede justification, whether faith or works, merit the grace of justification." (Trent, Sess. VI, Chapter VIII, Schroeder, *op. cit.*, pag. 35.)

[16]". . . no one can know with the certainty of faith, which cannot be subject to error, that he has obtained the grace of God." (Trent, Sess. VI, Chapter IX. Cf. Schroeder, *loc. cit.*)

[17]Catherinus was one of the few Dominicans at Trent who came to the Order already formed. He was beyond doubt a man of great talent—he had gained the *Doctorate* in both Laws at the age of sixteen—but he did not escape the common faults of the self-taught in theology. He had renounced a promising career to become a Dominican in 1517, being at that time thirty years of age. He came to Trent as a theologian of the pope, and was made a bishop during the first epoch.

[18]". . . fere ad litteram desumpta est ex S. Thomae opusculo, 'de articulis fidei et Ecclesiae Sacramentis.' " (Denziger, *Enchiridion Symbolorum* [Friburgi: B. Herder Book Co., 1937] pag. 254, nota ad n. 695.)

a source of much discussion until the end. The Spanish bishops and theologians were almost unanimous in favor of the definition of both. In the presence of the still current conciliar theories Rome was understandably uneasy. The majority, however, of the Italian Dominicans were with the Spanish faction. It must be noted that the Spanish faction was not infected with conciliar theories; headed by Pedro de Soto they maintained that the power of order and jurisdiction is inherent in the episcopate, but that the application of this power depends upon the supreme pontiff.[19]

In the final definitions Rome prevailed. The Council did not go as far as the Spaniards would have preferred. On his death bed, Pedro de Soto had written to the pope of the need for a definition of residence by divine law, the divine institution of the episcopacy, and the primacy of the papacy over the Church and over a general council: "If [the Council] does not do this, I do not doubt that the Apostolic See will lose much and your Holiness will incur ultimate damnation in the judgment of God."[20] These are hard words, directed to a pope by a simple religious. In context they are not quite as drastic as they appear here, but there can be no doubt as to the seriousness of the question in the mind of Soto. Soto was not alone in his realization of the seriousness of the question, and if the disputed phrase, "by divine law," did not enter into the final decree, it is not possible to say that the controversy was fruitless. The Council did decree that the episcopacy is of divine institution and is superior to the priesthood,[21] and the decree on reform in the same session leaves no doubt as to the fact of the obligation of residence.[22]

The Council was an accomplished fact; the task remained of completing the work of the Council by carrying out its reforms in the Church as a whole. Three Dominicans were represented on the commission named by Pope Paul IV for the writing of an official Catechism: Lionardo Marini, Archbishop of Lanciano; Egidio Foscarari, Bishop of Modena; and the Portugese theologian, Francisco Foreiro.[23]

Divine Providence had reserved for the Order yet another singular glory, in the person of a pope who was to dedicate his reign to the

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[19]Carro, *op. cit.*, pag. 209.

[20]"Si vero non fecerit, non dubito, multum Sedem Apostolicam amissuram et Sanctitem vestram ultimam damnation in Iudicio Dei incursuram." The whole letter may be found in Carro, *El Maestro Pedro de Soto, O.P. (confesor de Carlos V) y las controversias politico-teologicas en el siglo XVI* [Salamanca, Convento de San Esteban, 1931] vol. I pag 376.

[21]Trent, Session XXIII, Decree on the Sacrament of Order, Chapter IV (Cf. Schroeder, *op. cit.*, pag. 161.)

[22]*Ibid.* Decree concerning reform, Chapter I (Schroeder, pag. 164) The Spanish bishops and theologians would have preferred a more explicit definition of their position—a position which, we must never forget, was in its totality as offensive to the conciliars as to those who were anxious for the rights of the Roman See. Cf. Carro, *Los Dominicos y el Concilio de Trento*, page 218.

[23]Carro, op. cit., pag. 51; cf. Pastor, *History of the Popes* (St. Louis, B. Herder Book Co., 1928), vol. XVI, pag. 28.

completion of the work of the Council: Saint Pius V. With such a pope, as Father Carro remarks,[24] an express definition of the divine law in the residence of pastors was not needed. The terrible purge of the lazy and often scheming clerics from the confines of Rome which had begun under Pope Paul IV was completed by Saint Pius V. The reform of the Church, *in capite et in membris* was, for the time at least, a fact. The way was prepared for the great offensive action which we know as the Counter-Reformation.

Jordan Bishop, O.P.

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[24] *Op. cit.*, pag. 221.

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
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